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REVISITING THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF 




The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) is a court of first and last in-
stance.
1
Its decisions are “final and without appeal.”
2
At first blush, this 
seems uncontroversial; it is a simple restatement of the well-established 
principle of res judicata.3 But if the court makes a judicial pronouncement 
without all the facts to hand, can one say that the decision is legitimate and 
authoritative?
4
Pursuant to article 61 of the ICJ’s Statute, the court does 
have the authority to revise a judgment in certain, limited circumstances.
5
Revision is a remedy that enables the court, upon the application of a party, 
to reconsider an otherwise final and binding decision.
6
An application for 
revision is admissible when a new fact is discovered that was unknown to 
the parties and the court during the proceedings, and which would have the
effect of overturning or altering the court’s judgment.
7
* BA LLB/LP Hons (Flin) LLM International Law (Cantab) PhDc (Melb). This work 
is derived from my PhD research, so I must give thanks to my supervisors Professor Hilary 
Charlesworth and Professor Margaret Young for their support.
1. Robert Jennings & Rosalyn Higgins, General Introduction, in THE STATUTE OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY 7 (Andreas Zimmermann, Karin 
Oellers-Frahm, Christian Tomuschat, Christian Tams, Maral Kashgar & David Diehl eds., 2d 
ed. 2012). It is “a forum of first and last resort.” Jan Paulsson, Jurisdiction and Admissibility,
in GLOBAL REFLECTIONS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMERCE AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
601, 603 (Gerald Askin ed., 2005).
2. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 60, Oct. 24, 1945, U.N.T.S. 993 
[hereinafter Statute ICJ]; see also Joan E. Donoghue, The Role of the World Court Today, 47 
GA. L. REV. 181, 193 (2012); Jens Evensen, The International Court of Justice Main Charac-
teristics and Its Contribution to the Development of the Modern Law of Nations, 57 NORDIC J.
INT’L L. 3, 12 (1988).
3. See Derek W. Bowett, Res Judicata and the Limits of Rectification of Decisions by 
International Tribunals, 8 AFR. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 577 (1996); Andreas Kulick, Article 60 
ICJ Statute, Interpretation Proceedings, and the Competing Concepts of Res Judicata, 28 
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 73 (2015).
4. As noted by Caron, “the legitimacy and authority of the Court ultimately rest on the 
quality of its judgments” in David D. Caron, War and International Adjudication: Reflections 
on the 1899 Peace Conference, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 4, 26 (2000).
5. Statute ICJ, supra note 2, art. 61; Rules of Court, 6 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. 90, art. 99.
6. Statute ICJ, supra note 2, art. 60; Donoghue, supra note 2, at 192; Evensen, supra 
note 2, at 3.
7. The precise terms of art. 61 are discussed infra Part II. 
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Revision is described by Robin Geiß as “a rather neglected form of pro-
ceedings.”
8
 While the rule has domestic law analogues,
9
 and has existed in 
its essentials since 1899,
10
 it was not until 1984 that the court first received 
an application for revision of a judgment in the case of Tunisia v. Libya.11 
Since then, there have been five applications for revision, of which three 
have proceeded to a judgment on the question of admissibility.
12
 To date, 
the court has not revised  any of its judgments. 
By way of example, the court is regularly called upon to delimit con-
tested boundaries between states. The competing territorial claims may be 
justified, among other things, on the basis of geography, history, effectivités, 
or the doctrine of uti possidetis.13 The court will base its decision on the evi-
dence presented in support of these justifications,
14
 which will bar the sub-
sequent litigation of any part of the judgement.
15
 Indeed, this was precisely 
the situation in the Case concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier 
Dispute between El Salvador and Honduras, in which a Chamber of the 
 
 8. Robin Geiß, Revision Proceedings before the International Court of Justice, 63 
HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 167, 167 (2003). 
 9. While space prevents me from going into detail, see 28 U.S.C. § 399 (2020); Fed-
eral Court Rules 2011 (Cth) § 39.05, (Austl.); FED. R. CIV. P. 59; Code Civ. Procedure § 115 
(India); Civ. Procedure Code § 115 (Bangl.); CODE DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.] §§ 593–
603 (Fr.). The German civil code provides for “revision” but functionally operates as appeal 
insofar as the decision of the Bundesgerichtshof to accept a motion for revision depends upon 
systemic factors such as whether the case raises a legal question of fundamental importance or 
a need to promote the development of the law. The decision then annuls the original judgment 
of the lower court and replaces it. See also Daniel Mitidiero, The Ideal Court of Last Resort: A 
Court of Interpretation and Precedent, 5 INT’L J. PROC. L. 201, 213 (2015); Pablo Bravo-
Hurtado, Two Ways to Uniformity: Recourse to the Supreme Court in the Civil Law and the 
Common Law World, in NOBODY’S PERFECT – COMPARATIVE ESSAYS ON APPEALS AND 
OTHER MEANS OF RECOURSE AGAINST JUDICIAL DECISIONS IN CIVIL MATTERS 319 (A. 
Uzelac & C.H. van Rhee eds. 2014). 
 10. Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes art. 55, July 29, 
1899, 1 Bevans 230. 
 11. See Application for Revision and Interpretation of Judgment, Continental Shelf 
(Tunis./Libya), Application, 1985 I.C.J. Rep. 192 (July 27). 
 12. Application for Revision and Interpretation of Judgment on Continental Shelf (Tu-
nis./Libya), Judgment, 1985 I.C.J. Rep. 192, ¶ 192 (Dec. 10); Application for Revision of 
Judgment of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. 
v. Yugoslavia), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. Rep. 7 (Feb. 3); Application for Revision of Judgment 
of Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal./Hond.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. Rep. 
392, ¶¶ 401–402 (Sept. 11); Application for Revision of Judgment of Sovereignty over Pedra 
Branca/Pulau Batu Pueh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malay. v. Sing.), Judgment, 2017 
I.C.J. Rep. 3 (Feb. 2) (case was discontinued following a negotiated settlement); Application 
of Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. 
Serb.), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. Rep. 43 (Feb. 26); see also infra Part III.A.3. 
 13. Brian Taylor Sumner, Territorial Disputes at the International Court of Justice, 53 
DUKE L.J., 1779, 1781–92 (2004). 
 14. See Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, Evidence before the International Court of Justice, 1 
INT’L L.F. DROIT INT’L, 202 (1999).  
 15. See Bowett, supra note 3, at 577; Kulick, supra note 3, at 73. 
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Court delimited part of the frontier line between the two states and settled 
the legal situation in respect of certain islands in the Gulf of Fonseca.
16
But, 
nine years and 364 days after the judgment was delivered, El Salvador 
claimed that it had new evidence to prove the boundary had been incorrectly 
fixed and requested that the court revise its earlier decision, essentially a re-
quest to redraw the boundary delimited a decade previously.
While in this particular instance the court held that the new evidence, 
including a new copy of the 1794 map Carta Esférica did not require the 
court to overturn its original decision,
17
there is the potential for a request to 
redraw a settled boundary to undermine international peace and security as 
tensions reignite over claims to territory.
18
In particular, if the court makes a 
judicial pronouncement without all the facts on hand, this may reflect poorly 
on the substantive justice meted out by the court. A decision based on in-
complete information may not be complied with,
19
and may in turn under-
mine the court’s already fragile legitimacy.
20
This article considers the court’s procedural approach to revision.
21
  To 
begin, Part II will describe the historical development of the revision rule, 
16. Land, Island, and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal./Hond.), Judgment, 1992 I.C.J. 
Rep. 351 ¶¶ 599–600 (Sept. 11). A five-member Chamber of the Court had been constituted 
under art. 26(2) of the Statute and art. 17 of the Rules of Court, at the parties’ request. A new 
Chamber was constituted to hear the revision proceedings.
17. Application for Revision of Judgment on the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier 
Dispute (El Sal./Hond.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. Rep. 392, ¶¶ 410–411 (Dec. 18).
18. See generally KAIYAN HOMI KAIKOBAD, INTERPRETATION AND REVISION OF 
INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY DECISIONS (2012).
19. See Thomas Franck, Fairness in the International Legal and Institutional System, 
240 RECUEIL DES COURS 22, 303 (1993).
20. Filippo Fontanelli & Paolo Busco, The Function of Procedural Justice in Interna-
tional Adjudication, L. & PRAC. INT’L CTS. & TRIBS., 1, 21 (2016); Caron, supra note 4, at 26 
(noting, “the legitimacy and authority of the Court ultimately rest on the quality of its judg-
ments.”); see also LEGITIMACY AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS (Nienke Grossman, Harlan 
Grant Cohen, Andreas Follesdal & Geir Ulfstein eds., 2018); INTERNATIONAL COURT 
AUTHORITY (Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer & Mikael Rask Masden eds., Oxford Univ. 
Press 2018); Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer & Mikael Madsen, International Court Au-
thority (iCourts Working Paper Series, No. 112, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3096930; Nienke Grossman, Legitimacy and International Adjudica-
tive Bodies, 41 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 107, 112 (2009) (defining a legitimate international 
court as “one whose authority is perceived as justified.”).
21. The individual elements required under article 61 of the Court’s Statute to permit 
revision have been studied in depth by others, e.g., the problem of accurately defining the 
‘facts’ that must be considered. JUAN JOSÉ QUINTANA, LITIGATION AT THE INTERNATIONAL 
COURT OF JUSTICE 1025–56 (2015); see also WILLIAM MICHAEL REISMAN, NULLITY AND 
REVISION: THE REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL JUDGMENTS AND AWARDS
425 (1971) [hereinafter REISMAN, NULLITY AND REVISION]; WILLIAM MICHAEL REISMAN,
THE SUPERVISORY JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE:
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION (1997); SHABTAI 
ROSENNE, INTERPRETATION, REVISION AND OTHER RECOURSE FROM INTERNATIONAL 
JUDGMENTS AND AWARDS (2017); Robin Geiß & Andreas Zimmermann, Article 61, in THE 
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY 1651 (Andreas 
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inspired by Viñuales’ call to make connections between the past and the 
present in matters of institutional design.
22
The drafting history of revision 
explains why the procedure takes the form that it does, as well as its ambi-
tions and its limitations. In particular, Part II identifies that revision has of-
ten conceptually been conflated with annulment. But these remedies are 
quite different in scope and purpose, and the distinction has impacts on the 
court’s practice today. Part III then proceeds to identify and critically ana-
lyze procedural problems that have arisen, or which have the potential to 
arise, in light of the court’s jurisprudence. This Part will show that revision 
is a procedure that has remained essentially unchanged from its nineteenth 
century iteration, giving rise to a series of procedural problems. In particu-
lar, the court’s practice of treating a revision application as a new case and 
permitting the revision of incidental proceedings gives rise to potentially il-
logical outcomes, such as a binding decision on the merits that was issued 
ultra vires. Part IV offers some proposals to rectify the current flaws in the 
court’s approach to revising its judgements. Here it is suggested that the 
court may, by making small adjustments to its revision procedure, continue 
to rely on the revision procedure as an instrument of substantive justice 
without the risks associated with its current approach. Part V concludes.
II.  The History of Revision: From Finality to Justice
The revision procedure has domestic law antecedents. While Del Vec-
chi claims that “no juridical institution is to be regarded as a prototype of 
others,”
23
the generally accepted view is that analogies taken from national 
law were, and remain, “a key factor in determining the nature of an interna-
tional court of justice, and in filling in its constituent statute.”
24
Indeed, 
Judge Shahabuddeen has observed that “[t]he history of the creation of the 
Permanent Court makes it clear that the concept of a court of justice to 
which the Court was intended to conform was that of a court of justice as 
generally understood in municipal law.”
25
This Part begins with domestic 
Zimmermann, Christian J. Tams, Karin Oellers-Frahm & Christiam Tomuschat eds., 3d ed. 
2019); KAIKOBAD, supra note 18.
22. Jorge E. Viñuales, Experiments in International Adjudication Past and Present, in 
EXPERIMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION: HISTORICAL ACCOUNTS 29 (Ignacio de la 
Rasilla & Jorge E. Viñuales eds., 2019). 
23. Giorgio Del Vecchio, Universal Comparative Law, in 3 EVOLUTION OF LAW:
SELECT READINGS ON THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS:
FORMATIVE INFLUENCES OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENT 63 (A. Kocourek & J.H. Wigmore eds., 
1918).
24. Ole Spiermann, Who Attempts Too Much Does Nothing Well: The 1920 Advisory 
Committee of Jurists and the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 73 BRIT.
Y.B. INT’L L. 187, 259 (2002).
25. Land, Island, and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal./Hond.), Order, 1990 I.C.J. 
Rep. 3, 18 (Feb. 28) (Shahabuddeen, J., dissenting). But see Mathilde Cohen, The Continuing 
Impact of French Legal Culture on the International Court of Justice, in COMPARATIVE 
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law antecedents and analogies of judicial revision, moving to address early 
international law scholarship, emphasizing the drafting history of article 61 
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. A close reading of the 
drafting history reveals the limits of revision as a procedural function. In 
particular, a distinction can and must be drawn between the judicial purpos-
es of appeal, nullification, and revision. This will in turn inform the discus-
sion of the court’s present current practice in Part III.
The current procedure for the revision of judgments is articulated in ar-
ticle 61 of the court’s Statute. It states:
1. An application for revision of a judgment may be made only 
when it is based upon the discovery of some fact of such a na-
ture as to be a decisive factor, which fact was, when the judg-
ment was given, unknown to the Court and also to the party 
claiming revision, always provided that such ignorance was not 
due to negligence.
2. The proceedings for revision shall be opened by a judgment of 
the Court expressly recording the existence of the new fact, 
recognizing that it has such a character as to lay the case open 
to revision, and declaring the application admissible on this 
ground.
3. The Court may require previous compliance with the terms of 
the judgment before it admits proceedings in revision.
4. The application for revision must be made at latest within six 
months of the discovery of the new fact.
5. No application for revision may be made after the lapse of ten 
years from the date of the judgment.
26
This procedure is supplemented by articles 99 and 100 of the Rules of 
Court. These require that a request for the revision of a judgment is made by 
an application and state that the court will rule on the question of the admis-
sibility of that application before proceeding to the act of revision.
27
Upon 
the discovery of a previously unknown fact, a party can make an application 
for revision, and the revision proceedings have to be (by convention) en-
tered in the General List as formally distinct proceedings from the initial 
case.
28
However, the court must be convinced of the need to revise its judg-
ment; it is not a procedure accessible to the parties by right. Not only must 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 181, 198 (Anthea Roberts, Paul B. Stephan, Pierre-Hughes Verdier & 
Mila Versteeg eds., 2018) (the “[f]ramers of the ICJ and its predecessor courts were not so 
much looking toward national high courts as their inspiration, but rather toward international 
arbitral tribunals”).
26. Statute ICJ, supra note 2, art. 61.
27. Rules of Court, 6 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. 90, arts. 99, 100.
28. For a description of this process, see Juan J. Quintana, Procedures Before the ICJ:
A Note on the Opening (or Not) of New Cases, 9 L. & PRAC. INT’L TRIBS. 115, 117 (2010). 
For more on the General List, see SHABTAI ROSENNE, The General List of the International 
Court of Justice, in ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 197, 197–98 (2007). 
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“new” facts have come to light, but those facts must also be “decisive.” The 
facts must be of such a nature that knowledge of their existence would have 
“changed the decision of the Court.”
29
A. Domestic Analogies
To make a decision that is not subject to further scrutiny is an “attribute 
of ultimate ‘sovereignty.’”
30
As the decision-making function of the sover-
eign was delegated to subordinate persons and institutions, there would in-
evitably arise decisions that the sovereign did not agree with, and desired to 
change, amend, or revise.
31
The letters of Hammurabi show that he “investi-
gated the suits of his poorest subjects, and did not hesitate to reverse the de-
cisions of his governors.”
32
Procedures for the reconsideration of judgments 
are evident in major domestic legal systems and international law. Both 
common and civil law jurisdictions have long known forms of appeal. Alt-
hough there are exceptions, French procedure provides for review of judg-
ments in first instance by way of appel.33 Since 1790, the French judiciary 
has adopted a two-level appellate structure. The Cours d’appel hear appeals 
as of right, an invention of the civil law.
34
Above the Cours d’appel sits the 
Cour de cassation, a body to which a pourvoi en cassation can be brought 
to quash the decisions of lower courts for errors of law. The matter is then 
usually remitted to the lower court for a decision on the merits in light of the 
ruling on the law.
35
Similarly, the German model provides for “revision” but 
29. Application for Revision and Interpretation of Continental Shelf Judgment (Tu-
nis./Libya), Judgment, 1985 I.C.J. Rep. 192, 246 (Dec. 10) (Schwebel, J., writing separately).
30. Martin Shapiro, Appeal, 14 L. & SOC’Y REV. 629, 635 (1980).
31. Lord Justice Atkin, Appeal in English Law, 3 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 1, 1 (1927); see also 
Peter F.W. Burns, The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council: Constitutional Bulwark or 
Colonial Remnant, 5 OTAGO L. REV. 503, 504 (1984) (noting that “[a]ppellate jurisdiction had 
its genesis in the theory that the King was the source and dispenser of justice throughout his 
dominions and was therefore the authority to be resorted to in any case of grievance by error, 
delay or obstruction in the ordinary courts.”).
32. Stanley A. Cook, Ancient Semitic Procedure, in 2 EVOLUTION OF LAW: SELECT 
READINGS ON THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 659 (Albert Kocou-
rek & John H. Wigmore eds. 1915).
33. Nina Nichols Pugh, The Structure and Role of Courts of Appeal in Civil Law Sys-
tems, 35 LA. L. REV. 1163, 1164–65 (1975). The French appeal procedure “permits a thor-
ough overhaul of the case, extending to a retaking of old, as well as the taking of new, testi-
mony and the exploration of issues of law that were not raised in the first instance 
proceedings.” ARTHUR TAYLOR VON MEHREN & JAMES RUSSELL GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAW 
SYSTEM 104 (2d ed. 1977).
34. John T. Hood Jr., The Right of Appeal, 29 LA. L. REV. 498, 498 (1969). 
35. VON MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra note 33, at 104; JOHN BELL, JUDICIARIES 
WITHIN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE REVIEW 47 (2006). Since 1979, the Cour de cassation has 
had the power of cassation sans renvoi; that is, to “enter a definitive judgment” where quash-
ing the decision of the lower court “does not require further inquiry into the facts of the case.”
However, this does not fundamentally alter the fact that the Cour de cassation is a court of 
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functionally operates as appeal insofar as the decision of the Bun-
desgerichtshof to accept a motion for revision depends upon systemic fac-
tors such as whether the case raises a legal question of fundamental im-
portance or a need to promote the development of the law. The decision 
then annuls the original judgment of the lower court and replaces it.
36
The history of the common law courts of appeal is significantly differ-
ent. Appeal as of right was unknown; rather, appeal on questions of law (not 
fact) could be instigated by the issuance of a prerogative writ.
37
Other do-
mestic legal systems have developed similar appellate procedures.
38
Appeal serves both an immediate “error correction” function,
39
and also 





review but does not re-decide cases submitted to it. JOHN BELL, SOPHIE BOYRON, & SIMON 
WHITTAKER, PRINCIPLES OF FRENCH LAW 3, 47, 48, 107 (1998). 
36. See Mitidiero, supra note 9, at 213; see also Bravo-Hurtado, supra note 9, at 319. 
37. At the King’s courts there were three writs available: 
[A] writ of prohibition which prevents a court from exercising jurisdiction which 
does not belong to it and stops proceedings in it altogether, the writ of mandamus 
which compels a court to proceed and do justice according to the law, and, lastly, a 
very important writ, the writ of Certiorari, which brought up decisions at the law 
courts for review before the King’s court to be quashed for excessive jurisdiction or 
for error if it was placed on record that there was an obvious mistake in law.
Atkin, supra note 31, at 1, 2, 5. There was also a “writ of error” available in the common law 
courts. The writ was regarded as “an entirely new proceeding” and not as a continuation of the 
case under consideration, as in the civil system. Hood, supra note 34, at 499. This situation 
pertained until the United Kingdom’s Judicature Act of 1873 established the Court of Appeal. 
From the Court of Appeal lay further appeal to the House of Lords (now Supreme Court) un-
der the United Kingdom’s Appellate Jurisdiction Act of 1876. In the United States, the Judici-
ary Act of 1789 created the Supreme Court and adopted “a procedure similar to the common 
law writ of error,” until the creation of the federal courts of appeal by the Evarts Act of 1891. 
See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73; Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826; Hood, supra
note 34, at 512.
38. While it is not the place of this study to undertake a comprehensive review of ap-
pellate procedures in domestic legal systems, it is worth noting that appellate procedures were 
also well established in the Russian legal system. See generally GORDON B. SMITH,
REFORMING THE RUSSIAN LEGAL SYSTEM (1996); Marianna Muravyeva, Russian Early 
Modern Criminal Procedure and Culture of Appeal, 38 REV. CENT. E. EUR. L. 295 (2013); 
Jane Henderson, Improvements in Russian Courts: Citizens’ Appeals and Judges, 2 EUR. PUB.
L. 508 (1996). For examples from countries in Asia, such as South Korea and Japan, see Do 
Myoun-Hoi, Discontinuity And Continuity In The Traditional Korean Judicial System During 
Its Modern Reform Period, 1894 to 1905, 17 ACTA KOREANA 307 (2014); Tsukasa Mihira, 
Institutional Change and Judicial Review in Contemporary Japan, in THE CHANGING ROLE 
OF LAW IN JAPAN - EMPIRICAL STUDIES IN CULTURE, SOCIETY AND POLICY MAKING 173, 
179 (Dimitri Vanoverbeke, Jeroen Maesschalck, David Nelken & Stepham Parmentier eds., 
2014).
39. Chad M. Oldfather, Error Correction, 85 IND. L.J. 49, 60 (2010) (stating that the 
concern is not the governance of the system as a whole but rather the whether the “right” or 
“wrong” law was applied in the dispute.).
40. Mitidiero, supra note 9, at 210; see also Mateus Aimoré Carreteiro, Appellate Arbi-
tral Rules in International Commercial Arbitration, 33 J. INT’L ARB. 185, 190 n.31 (2016) 
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as expressed by Irene Ten Cate, “appellate review fulfils two principal func-
tions: error correction and lawmaking.”
42
The remedy of revision is distinct 
from appeals in civil and common law systems at least in part because it is 
“carried out by the same [international] tribunal which made the original 
decision.”
43
Derek Bowett correctly has emphasized that:
[R]evision is in no sense an appeal. It involves no hierarchy of 
courts, with the object of allowing a second, and different, court to 
reverse the findings of the first court. Revision allows a reference 
back to the same court on the very limited ground that the discov-
ery of new facts might justify the court in revising its own deci-
sion.
44
As such, the revision procedure provides for a “formal exception”
45
to the 
principle of res judicata.46 This principle of finality is closely related to the 
effectiveness of the resolution of disputes.
47
The remedy of revision is dis-
(stating that the Brazilian civil system distinguishes between “ordinary” appellate courts hav-
ing an error correction function and superior courts which serve the purpose of law harmoni-
zation).
41. In some instances, such as with a court of cassation, the only purpose of an appeal 
is to ensure the proper application of law; the application of that law to the facts is reserved 
for the court below. See BELL ET AL., supra note 35, at 3; VON MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra
note 33, at 104.
42. Irene Ten Cate, International Arbitration and the Ends of Appellate Review, 44
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1109, 1110 (2012). However, according to some legal scholars, 
appeal can be conceived as a form of patronage (benevolent intervention from a supreme au-
thority), as a form of distributive politics (the adoption of efficient rules through market forc-
es), and as a form of political integration (promoting unity). Shapiro, supra note 30, at 635. 
There is also the incentive of “error avoidance,” whereby judges of lower courts will be, Cate 
argues, more diligent when they know they are subject to review. Cate at 1143, 1147–48. 
However, the dominant view in the literature is that the primary goal of appeal lies in this dual 
function of error correction and law harmonization.
43. Derek W. Bowett, Res Judicata and the Limits of Rectification of Decisions by In-
ternational Tribunals, 8 AFR. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 577, 577 (1996). 
44. Id. at 591. 
45. REISMAN, NULLITY AND REVISION, supra note 21, at 425; see also Geiß & Zim-
merman, supra note 21, at 1654 (noting that, “revision adversely affects the principle of judi-
cata”); CHESTER BROWN, A COMMON LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 161 (2007) 
(suggesting that revision “does some violence to the principle of res judicata”).
46. Edgardo Sobenes Obregon, Res Judicata and the Test of Finality, 5 J. TERRITORIAL 
& MAR. STUDS. 75 (2018); Kulick, supra note 3, at 75; Iain Scobbie, Res Judicata, Precedent 
and the International Court: A Preliminary Sketch, 20 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 299, 303 (1999); 
Bowett, supra note 43, at 577; BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY 
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 336–56 (1987).
47. Dinah Shelton, Form, Function, and the Powers of International Courts, 9 
CHINESE J. INT’L L., 537, 558 (2009); Yuval Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of Interna-
tional Courts: A Goal-Based Approach, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 225, 245 (2012); see also Charter 
of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 36 ¶ 3 , June 26, 
1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153 (stating that “legal disputes should as a
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tinct from appeal, at least in part, because it is “carried out by the same tri-
bunal which made the original decision”
48
 but also because no res judicata 
will arise until the final appeal is heard.
49
 
Thus, revision cannot be conceived as serving an error correction or 
lawmaking function.
50
 Instead, the purpose of revision is to return to the 
original judgment and ensure it reflects the facts that the court ought to have 
known at the time when it renders the judgement. It is a protection against 
the miscarriage of justice,
51
 where, for reasons of ignorance or through de-
liberate fraud, the evidence presented to the court was misleading.
52
 
The distinct function of revision from that of appeal is also evident in 
revision’s historical roots in equity.
53





 and the United States each incorporate a procedure for the amend-
ment of judgments after they have been handed down.
56
 Revision is also 
commonly used in civil law systems.
57
 While there are slight variations in 
each jurisdiction, in all cases, revision requires the application of a party. 
This is contrary to situations where a court has an inherent jurisdiction to 
correct a slip or error,
58
 or declare void and set aside a judgment so irregular 




general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice”); Nuclear Tests 
Case (N.Z. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974, I.C.J. Rep. 457 ¶ 476 (Dec. 20).  
 48. Bowett, supra note 43, at 577. 
 49. CHENG, supra note 46, at 372. 
 50. Contra REISMAN, NULLITY AND REVISION, supra note 21, at 217–18 (taking the 
view that appeal, review, revision, interpretation, and rectification are relatively indistinguish-
able, save for the fact that appeal and review take place before a new tribunal and their respec-
tive “emotive differences”).  
 51. Bowett, supra note 43, at 591. For this reason, revision is a remedy available in 
respect of both civil and criminal judgments; see also Hakan Friman, International Criminal 
Procedures: Trial and Appeal Procedures, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
LAW 271, 281–83 (William A. Schabas & Nadia Bernaz eds., 2011); Anne-Marie La Rosa, 
Revision Procedure under the ICC Statute, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT 1559 (Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta & John R.W.D. Jones eds., 2015). 
 52. Catherine A. Kunz, Revision of Arbitral Awards in Switzerland: An Extraordinary 
Tool or Simply a Popular Chimera?, 3 ASA BULL. 6, 6 (2020) (stating “[Revision] is only 
available in exceptional circumstances where justice and equity command.”); cf Nathalie Vos-
er & Anya George, Revision of Arbitral Awards 43 (Post Award Issues: ASA Special Ser. No. 
38, 2011). 
 53. Rosemary Krimbel, Rehearing Sua Sponte in the U.S. Supreme Court: A Procedure 
for Judicial Policymaking, CHI.-KENT L. REV. 919, 930 (1989).  
 54. Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106 ¶ 399(2) (Can.).  
 55. Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 39.05 (Austl.). 
 56. FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e); see also Civ. Procedure Code, Act No. 5 of 1908, § 115 (In-
dia); Civ. Procedure Code, Act No. V of 1908, § 115 (Bangl.). 
 57. See CODE DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.] arts. 593–603 (Fr.). 
 58. Lawrie v Lees (1881) 7 App Cas 19, 34-5 (Austl.); see also Civ. Procedure Code, 
Act No. 5 of 1908, § 152 (India); Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 39.05(e) (Austl.); FED. R. 
CIV. P. 60(c); The Civil Procedure Rules 1998, c. 40 §12 (UK); Federal Courts Rules, 
SOR/98-106 ¶ 397(2) (Can.). In respect of correcting a slip or error at the ICJ, see Geiß & 
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However, the grounds for revision of a judgment vary from country to 
country. In France, the Code de procédure civile provides for the revision of 
a judgment in cases where witness or documentary evidence is later found 
to be false.
60
Canadian federal courts will set aside or amend an order on the 
basis of “a matter that arose or was discovered subsequent to the making of 
the order.”
61
The United States formulation closely resembles the ICJ Stat-
ute: “newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not 
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial,”
62
with express provi-
sion for a “rehearing.”
63
The roots of revision in domestic law highlight the 
importance of revision as a means of doing substantial justice to the par-
ties.
64
They also illustrate critical points about revision procedure: first, revi-
sion is a remedy, demanding the reopening of a case and a variation of the 
judgment; second, it is a distinct procedure from the courts’ inherent juris-
diction to declare void and set aside a judgment so irregular as to amount to 
a nullity; and third, it differs from appeal insofar as the appeal is a process, 
not a remedy, demanding no particular outcome. By contrast, revision “has 
as its raison d’être in the discovery of some new fact”65 that would have led 
the court to a different conclusion.
B. Early International Arbitration
One can see different approaches in early international arbitration. 
Agreements to arbitrate “differences of an important character”
66
between 
pre-Westphalian sovereigns at times included mechanisms for appeal or cor-
rection of the decisions. For example, an arbitration treaty between the 
Duke of Burgundy and the Count of Nevers reserved to the arbitrator, King 
Philip III of France, a power to “correct and to interpret” the award, which 
Zimmermann, supra note 21, at 1651; Application for Revision and Interpretation of the 
Judgment of Continental Shelf (Tunis./Libya), Judgment, 1985, I.C.J. Rep. 192, 198 (Dec. 
10).
59. Craig v. Kanssen [1943] KB 256 (Eng.); Chief Kofi Forfie, Odikro of Marban v. 
Barima Kwabena Seifah, Kenyasehene, 2 J. Afr. L. 46, 47 (P.C. Appeal, 1958) (Ghana); see 
also CODE DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.] arts. 112–121 (Fr.); Taylor v Taylor (1979) 25 
ALR 418, 424 (Austl.) (stating the court has the inherent power to set aside an order made 
against a person who did not have a reasonable opportunity to appear and present their case).
60. CODE DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.] art. 595 (Fr.) (“reconnues ou judiciairement 
déclarées fausses depuis le jugement.”). 
61. Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106 ¶ 399(2)(a) (Can.). 
62. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(2). 
63. Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, 28 U.S.C. § 44 (2019). 
64. See Condon (Trustee) Re Rayhill (Bankrupt) v Truthful Endeavour Pty Ltd (2015) 
323 ALR 83, 105 (Austl.).
65. Bowett, supra note 43, at 589. 
66. See Henry S. Fraser, Sketch of the History of International Arbitration, 11 
CORNELL L. REV. 179, 193 (1926). 
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was exercised in 1285.
67
Additionally, Pierre Dubois of Normandy’s 1306 
plans for the creation of an arbitral court consisted of a bench of six judges
from whom there would be one appeal to the Pope.
68
During the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, however, the use of arbi-
tration in international relations declined,
69
and therefore there is little evi-
dence of state practice concerning the revision of judgments. Yet, doctrinal 
debates continued regarding the role of arbitration.
70
Many of these debates 
centred on the question of whether the decision should be subject to appeal 
or reconsideration. Michael Reisman posits that, over the centuries, writers 
have fallen into one of two camps: “Finalists,” who maintained that finality 
of a judgment or award must be “inviolable;” and “revisionists,” who ar-
gued that “in order to flourish,” international arbitration must provide a sys-
tem of review.
71





and Grotius, who wrote:
[T]he Civil Law may direct and does in some places direct that it 
shall be lawful to appeal from them and to complain of their wrong; 
this cannot have a place between kings and peoples. For, in their 
case, there is no superior power, which can either bar or break the 
tie of the promise. And therefore they must stand by the decision 
whether it be just or unjust.
74
Likewise, Vattel argued that “if the injustice is of small consequence, it 
should be borne or the sake of peace.”
75
However, a closer reading of Vattel 
reveals that he also acknowledged the possibility of an ultra vires arbitral 
decision to which a party would not need to submit.
76
He put forward that a 
67. Tobias Theinel & Andreas Zimmermann, Article 60, in THE STATUTE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY, supra note 21, at 1623.
68. Fraser, supra note 66, at 179–80.  
69. See id. at 198 (describing this decline as “an eclipse”).
70. HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 1123 (Richard Tuck ed. 2005); 
see also Fraser, supra note 66, at 182. 
71. REISMAN, NULLITY AND REVISION, supra note 21, at 21.
72. SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, DE MODO LITIGANDI IN LIBERATE NATURALI [ON THE 
WAY OF DECIDING CONTROVERSIES IN THE LIBERTY OF NATURE] (W. Evans Darby trans., 
1899). Although Pufendorf acknowledged that States could agree to such a mechanism: W.
EVANS DARBY, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS: A COLLECTION OF THE VARIOUS SCHEMES 
WHICH HAVE BEEN PROPOUNDED, AND OF INSTANCES SINCE 1815 60 (4
3rd
ed, Peace Society, 
1900).
73. See EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL 
JUSTICE (Béla Kapossy & Richard Whatmore eds., Thomas Nugent trans., Liberty Fund, Inc. 
2008) (1758).
74. HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI ET PACIS 350–51 (William Whewell trans., Cam-
bridge 1st ed. 1853), cited in Reisman, NULLITY AND REVISION, supra note 21, at 22.
75. DE VATTEL, supra note 73, at 451.
76. Id. at 451.
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sentence “evidently unjust and unreasonable” would “deserve no atten-
tion.”
77
With the ratification of the 1794 Jay Treaty,78 the use of international 
arbitration witnessed a considerable increase.
79
By 1890, the Interparliamen-
tary Union “agreed upon the arbitration as the sine qua non of any treaty.”80
But the nineteenth-century international arbitration agreements rarely con-
tained a procedure for revision of the award.
81
One example is from 1898, 
wherein article 13 of the Arbitration Treaty between Italy and the Argentine 
Republic – one of only two general arbitration treaties in existence at the 
time – stated that:
The decision cannot be appealed from, and its execution is entrusted to 
the honor of the nations signatory to this agreement. However, a demand for 
revision will be allowed before the same tribunal which rendered the award 
and before it is executed:
(1) If it has been based upon a false or erroneous document;
(2) If the decision was in whole or in part the result of an error of 
positive or negative fact which results from the acts or docu-
ments in the case.
82
Another instance arose in an unratified 1897 Anglo-American treaty, 
which included permission for “a rehearing under certain determined condi-
tions.”
83
In an 1899 treaty, Argentina and Uruguay agreed to permit revision 
where the award was based on a document that had been falsified or tam-
pered with.
84
77. Id. at 451.
78. Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, U.S.-U.K., Nov. 19, 1794, 8 Stat. 
116; see also CHESTER BROWN, A COMMON LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 17 
(Oxford University Press 2007); Charles H. Brower II, The Functions and Limits of Arbitra-
tion and Judicial Settlement under Private and Public International Law, 18 DUKE J.
COMPAR. & INT’L L. 259, 269 (2008). 
79. Fraser, supra note 66, at 202–03.
80. ARTHUR EYFFINGER, THE 1899 HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE: ‘THE PARLIAMENT 
OF MAN, THE FEDERATION OF THE WORLD’ 366 (Kluwer Law International 1999).
81. In two arbitrations involving the United States, there was an attempt of revision of 
the award. Both instances were unsuccessful, and neither is discussed here because the parties 
had not agreed upon a procedure for revision in the compromis. See KAIKOBAD, supra note 
18, at 236.
82. General Treaty of Arbitration, It.-Arg., art. 13, July 23, 1898, 11 U.N.T.S 1776–
1949; see also JAMES BROWN SCOTT, THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE HAGUE PEACE 
CONFERENCES: TRANSLATION OF THE OFFICIAL TEXTS, THE CONFERENCE OF 1899, at 200–
02 (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1920) [hereinafter 
HAGUE 1899]. 
83. Id. at 624.
84. ARBITRATION TREATIES AMONG THE AMERICAN NATIONS TO THE CLOSE OF THE 
YEAR 1910, at 262 (William R. Manning, ed., Oxford Univ. Press 6th ed. 1924) (cited in 
KAIKOBAD, supra note 18, at 235).
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There were also contemporaneous, overlapping discussions regarding 
the possibility of annulling an arbitral award. For example, in 1867, Johann 
Caspar Bluntschli proposed that an award was invalid if the tribunal ex-
ceeded its powers or if there was dishonesty on the part of the arbitrators.
85
In 1875, the Institut de droit international drafted a Projet de règlement 
pour la procedure arbitrale internationale in the hope that it would be used 
by states as a starting point for drafting their arbitration agreements. Article 
27 of the Projet set out, “[t]he arbitration award is null in the event of a null 
compromis, or abuse of power, or proven corruption of one of the arbitrators 
or of essential error.”
86
Signor Pasquale Fiore, in 1897, suggested “an arbi-
tral sentence may be disputed. . . and may be annulled”
87
where the arbitra-
tors had gone beyond the limits of the compromis, or where it was “founded 
upon error, or obtained by fraud.”
88
In light of these limited examples, it is not surprising that Édouard 
Descamps noted in his seminal Essai sur l’organisation l’arbitrage interna-
tional in 1896 that appeal was not the currently accepted practice.89 But he 
also sought to grapple with the 1875 Projet and suggested that one of the 
benefits of a standing international court would be the ability to review the 
judgments of other tribunals for excès de pouvoir.90 Descamps observed that 
“the power of appeal exists in almost all civilized states and by analogy the 
majority of the Commission has accepted it,”
91
and as such, parties could 
legitimately provide for appeal procedures in their compromis. But the 1895 
Brussels Conference of the Interparliamentary Union, during which the first 
85. Johann Caspar Bluntschli, Arbitration Proceedings, in INTERNATIONAL 
TRIBUNALS: A COLLECTION OF THE VARIOUS SCHEMES WHICH HAVE BEEN PROPOUNDED,
AND OF INSTANCES IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 188, 190 (W. Evans Darby ed., Wentworth 
Press, 4th ed. 1904). 
86. “[l]a sentence arbitrale est nulle en cas de compromis nul, ou d’excès de pouvoir ou 
de corruption prouvée d’un des arbitres ou d’erreur essentielle.” INSTITUT DE DROIT INT’L,
PROJET DE RÈGLEMENT POUR LA PROCEDURE ARBITRALE INTERNATIONALE art. 27 (1875), 
https://www.idi-iil.org/app/uploads/2017/06/1875_haye_01_fr.pdf (Author’s translation above 
the line). An earlier draft by Dr. Levin Goldsmith, which would have provided recours for any 
one of eleven grounds of nullity, was rejected by the Institut. See REISMAN, NULLITY AND 
REVISION, supra note 21, at 31–34; Chester Brown, Supervision, Control, and Appellate Ju-
risdiction: The Experience of the International Court, 32 ICSID REV. 595, 597 (2017); 
KAIKOBAD, supra note 18, at 234. 
87. Signor P. Fiore, The Arbitration Tribunal, in INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS: A
COLLECTION OF THE VARIOUS SCHEMES WHICH HAVE BEEN PROPOUNDED, AND OF 
INSTANCES IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY, supra note 85, at 546, 570.
88. Id. For further examples and discussion thereof, see KAIKOBAD, supra note 18, at 
234; see also REISMAN, NULLITY AND REVISION, supra note 21, at 29–31.
89. EDOUARD DESCAMPS, ESSAI SUR L’ORGANISATION DE L’ARBITRAGE 
INTERNATIONAL MEMOIRE AUX PUISSANCES 30 (E. Guyot 1896). 
90. Id. at 34–35. 
91. “[l]a faculté d’appel existe dans presque tous les États civilises et par analogie la 
majorité de la Commission l’a admise.” Id. at 62–63 (Author’s translation.).
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parameters of an international court were agreed upon,
92
considered that an 
award should be final and without review.
93
C. The Hague Peace Conference of 1899
This short historical overview shows that at the close of the nineteenth 
century the notions of nullity and revision were somewhat overlapping, and 
the conceptual distinctions required refinement.
94
This began to emerge at 
the 1899 Hague Peace Conference, where the debate between finalists and 
revisionists arose again in a contestation between the American delegate 
Frederick Holls and his Russian counterpart Feodor Martens. Revision was 
in fact “the most vexed issue” in 1899.
95
It is worth considering their de-
bates in more detail especially because the ICJ’s current revision procedure 
is functionally identical to the one agreed upon in 1899.
96
One of the key ambitions of the Third Commission of the 1899 Confer-
ence was to establish a “uniform practice”
97
with respect to the mechanisms 
of peaceful settlement of disputes between states. Having received several 
motions on the subject of a permanent international court of arbitration,
98
a
Comité d’Examen was convened to discuss the establishment of such a court
and an arbitral procedure “accepted by all.”
99
The Comité opened its ninth 
meeting with the Russian Draft of Arbitral Code,
100
which provided that any 
arbitral award would be “without appeal.”
101
This proposal was objected to 
by the American delegation during the tenth meeting, with a request that 
this would be replaced with a provision that “every litigant shall have a right 
to a second hearing.”
102
A vote on the matter was postponed in light of the 
deadlock.
103
Martens argued that, should revision or appeal become an accepted pro-
cedure, “we shall tear down with one hand what we construct with the other 
92. EYFFINGER, supra note 80, at 366.
93. DESCAMPS, supra note 89, at 63.
94. KAIKOBAD, supra note 18, at 234.
95. Arthur Eyffinger, A Highly Critical Moment: Role and Record of the 1907 Hague 
Peace Conference, 54 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 197, 221 (2007).
96. SHABTAI ROSENNE, INTERPRETATION, REVISION AND OTHER RECOURSE FROM 
INTERNATIONAL JUDGMENTS AND AWARDS 9 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2007). 
97. Peace Conference at the Hague 1899: Russian Circular January 11, 1899, 
AVALON PROJ. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/hag99-02.asp, (last visited Mar. 10, 
2021). 
98. This included motions from the Russian, British, and American delegations. 
EYFFINGER, supra note 80, at 584.
99. HAGUE 1899, supra note 82, at 583. 
100. Id. at 180–83.
101. Id. at 180.
102. Id. at 733. 
103. Id. at 751.
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[and] perpetuate disputes which we would terminate.”
104
By contrast, the 
American delegation proposed that:
Every litigant which shall have submitted a case to the international 
tribunal shall have the right to a reexamination of its case before the 
same judges, within three months after the notification of the deci-
sion, if it declare itself able to invoke new evidence or questions of 
law not raised or settled the first time.
105
For the Americans, the matter was one of principle rather than form. 
Frederick W. Holls declared that he would “accept any text whatever,” pro-
vided there was some procedure for reconsideration of a case.
106
The Ger-
man delegate Philipp Zorn, attempting to surmount the impasse, pointed out 
that the American proposal “had nothing in common with appeal,” insofar 
as the proposal did not move the case from one judge to another, but rather 
“the same judges would complete, so to speak, their former information.”
107
Unanimity was never achieved in the Comité—neither on the principle 
of revision nor on the form revision should take.
108
The resulting article 55 
in the final text of Convention [No I]109 was a compromise, and an unsatis-
factory one at that.
110
Drafted by TMC Asser in consultation with Holls, and 
then further amended by the President of the Comité, Léon Bourgeois, the 
final formulation was replete with ambiguity. It read:
The parties can reserve in the compromis the right to demand the 
revision of the award.
In this case, and unless there be an agreement to the contrary, the 
demand must be addressed to the tribunal which pronounced the 
award. It can only be made on the ground of the discovery of some 
new fact which is of a nature to exercise a decisive influence upon 
104. Id. at 742.
105. The original American plan for a permanent international court had included a pro-
vision that “[e]very litigant before the International Tribunal shall have the right to make an 
appeal for re-examination of a case within three months after notification of the decision, up-
on presentation of evidence that the judgment contains a substantial error of fact or law.” U.S.
STATE DEP’T OFF. OF THE HISTORIAN, Instructions to the International (Peace) Conference at 
the Hague 1899, in 2 PAPER RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES,
WITH THE ANNUAL MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT TRANSMITTED TO CONGRESS 511 (Dec. 3, 
1907), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1907p2/ch97subch12; see also
HAGUE 1899, supra note 82, at 189.
106. HAUGE 1899, supra note 82, at 749.
107. Id. at 749.
108. Id. at 752–55.
109. Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes art. 55, July 29, 
1899, 1 Bevans 230. 
110. Contra ROSENNE, supra note 21, at 10 (taking the view that it was “well conceived 
and well laid, and [has] stood the tests of time.”).
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the award and which, at the time the discussion was closed, was 
unknown to the tribunal and to the party demanding the revision.
Proceedings for revision can only be instituted by a decision of the 
tribunal expressly recording the existence of the new fact, recogniz-
ing in it the character described in the preceding paragraph, and de-
claring the demand admissible on this ground.
The compromis fixes the period within which the demand for revi-
sion must be made.
111
Jonkheer van Karnebeek of the Dutch delegation considered the pro-
posal to actually imply appeal, rather than revision.
112
Cases of fraud were a 
“new fact,” Holls stated,
113
despite the British delegate, Sir Julian Paunce-
fote, requesting that situations of fraud be entirely excluded from rehear-
ing.
114
These questions and inconsistencies were left unresolved, however.
Later authors, such as Reisman, suggest “the travaux of the 1899 Act 
pressed the concept of new facts into an omnibus function, similar to that 
served by excès de pouvoir.”115 But this claim is not entirely made out, not 
least because the doctrine of excès de pouvoir does not serve such a func-
tion, rather it is a particular ground for annulling the decision of an arbitral 
tribunal on the basis of the tribunal having exceeded its jurisdiction.
116 Excès
de pouvoir was a concept very familiar to the members of the Comité,117 but 
111. Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, supra note 109, art.
55; HAGUE 1899, supra note 82, at 244.
112. HAGUE 1899, supra note 82, at 750; see also EYFFINGER, supra note 80, at 405.
113. HAGUE 1899, supra note 82, at 753.
114. EYFFINGER, supra note 80, at 393.
115. REISMAN, NULLITY AND REVISION, supra note 21, at 425. 
116. See Mohammed Bedjaoui, Jurisprudence Comparée des tribunaux administratifs 
Internationaux en matière d’excès de pouvoir, 2 ANNUAIRE FRANÇAIS DE DROIT INT’L 482 
(1956); Edouard Laferrière, Origine et Développement Historique du Recours pour Excès de 
Pouvoir, 5 LIBRARIE GENERALE DE DROIT ET DE JURISPRUDENCE 303 (1997); Arnold Raes-
tad, Le Recours à la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale Contre les Sentences des Tri-
bunaux d’Arbitrage Internationaux pour Cause d’Incompétence ou d’Excès de Pouvoir,
13(ser. 3) REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET DE LEGISLATION COMPAREE 302 (1932); 
Alfred Verdoss, Excès de Pouvoir du Juge Arbitral dans le Droit International Public, 9(ser. 
3) REVUE DE DROIT INT’L ET DE LEGISLATION COMPAREE 225 (1928); see also Case Con-
cerning the Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.), Judgment, 1991 I.C.J. 
Rep. 106 (Nov. 12) (separate opinion by Shahabuddeen, J.); Case Concerning the Arbitral 
Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.), Judgment, 1991 I.C.J. Rep. 130 (Nov. 12) 
(Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
117. See Edouard Descamps, Essai sur l’organisation de l’arbitrage international me-
moire aux puissances, 28(ser. 1) REVUE DE DROIT INT’L ET DE LEGISLATION COMPAREE 5, 
30 (1896).
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the drafters of article 55 instead adopted the terminology of “fait nou-
veau,”118 relying on the Italy-Argentina treaty of 1898 for guidance.119
Whether or not an award could be annulled on the basis of excès de 
pouvoir or any other ground was treated as a question separate from the re-
vision procedure and was left unresolved.
120
Holls’ suggestion that the 
Comité should accept the text of article 27 of the 1875 Projet was reject-
ed.
121
Article 26 of the Russian Draft of Arbitral Code, which declared that 
“[t]he arbitral award is void in case of a void compromis or exceeding of 
powers, or of corruption proved against one of the arbitrators,”
122
was not 
taken further and not incorporated into Convention [No I].123 The Comité
could not decide on who should judge such claims of invalidity, and so 
avoided the issue altogether, in the hope that the newly created Permanent 
Court of Arbitration could eventually “guide [s]tates to a solution of this 
matter.”
124
The important distinction between revision on the basis of fait 
nouveau and annulment for excès de pouvoir are discussed in Part IV, be-
low.
D. Revision at the PCIJ
While revision was one of the most hotly contested issues in The 
Hague, it was barely mentioned during the drafting of both the Permanent 
Court of International Justice (“PCIJ”) and ICJ Statutes.
125
As noted above, 
the present article 61 is substantially identical to article 55 of Convention 
[No I].126 Article 55 was retained, with inconsequential amendments,127 at 
the Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907. Martens did attempt to have 
118. A. PEARCE HIGGINS, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES AND OTHER 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES CONCERNING THE LAWS AND USAGES OF WAR 152–54
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1909). 
119. See HAGUE 1899, supra note 82 at 749, 753. The Comité, however, did not adopt 
the precise text of the 1898 treaty as it was considered too broad and too close to appeal.
120. Id. at 151.
121. Id. at 749–50.
122. Id.
123. Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, supra note 109, art.
55.
124. HAGUE 1899, supra note 82, at 151. 
125. The principle of revision of arbitral awards was debated during the 1912 Annual 
Meeting of the American Society of International Law, but those in favor of revision won the 
day. Joaquin D. Casasus & Frederic D. McKenney, Revision of Arbitral Awards, 6 PROCS.
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.: ANN. MEETING (1907-1917) 59 (1912).
126. Convention for Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, supra note 109.
127. The question of the time limit for revision was the subject of some contention, but 
this discussion does not have any impact on the present study. See also LEAGUE OF NATIONS
ADVISORY COMM. JURISTS, PROCÈS-VERBAUX OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE,
16 JUNE–24 JULY 1920, at 744 (The Hague, Van Langenuysen Bros. 1920); REISMAN,
NULLITY AND REVISION, supra note 21, at 425.
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the provision “suppressed” at the Conference, but his motion was “rejected 
almost unanimously.”
128
The Brazilian delegate Ruy Barbosa declared:
[T]here would be nothing more harmful to the authority of arbitra-
tion than to assure to such judgments the privilege of incontestabil-
ity. We must cling to the idea that arbitration is a means of peace 
only because it is an instrument of justice.
129
For the 1920 Commission of Jurists, the 1907 project “served as a point of 
departure,”
130
with the stipulation added that ignorance of the new fact must 
“not be due to a failure on the part of the party to use due diligence in the 
conduct of the case.”
131
Eventually, the phrase “not due to negligence” was 
settled on and “considered sufficient.”
132
The time limit for bringing an ap-
plication for revision was also extended to ten years overall, but within six 
months of the discovery of the new fact.
133
The only comment of any real 
substance relating to the revision procedure at the PCIJ came in the Adviso-
ry Committee of Jurists’ final 1924 report, authored by James Brown Scott:
The right of revision is a very important right, and affects adversely 
in the matter of res judicata, a point which for the sake of interna-
tional peace should be considered as finally settled. Justice, howev-
er, has certain legitimate requirements; the Committee, after due 
consideration, decided that there must be a right of revision.
134
Beyond this, no further debate was recorded. By contrast, a Romanian 
proposal to allow for appeal against a judgment of the PCIJ where it had 
failed to follow agreed procedure was dismissed as “useless and danger-
ous.”
135
It was “inadmissible that the Court should be able to annul its own 
decisions.”
136
No more was said on this matter.
137
128. REISMAN, NULLITY AND REVISION, supra note 21, at 425; see also HAGUE 1899,
supra note 82, at 369–71, 437; Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Dis-
putes, supra note 109.
129. 2 CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE, THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE HAGUE 
PEACE CONFERENCES: TRANSLATION OF THE OFFICIAL TEXTS, THE CONFERENCE OF 1907, at 
370 (Oxford Univ. Press 1920).
130. Leo Gross, New Rules and Institutions for the Peaceful Settlement of International 
Disputes, 76 PROCS. AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 131, 134 (1982) (quoting MANLEY O. HUDSON, THE 
PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 1920-1942, at 83–84 (Macmillan 1943)).
131. LEAGUE OF NATIONS ADVISORY COMM. JURISTS, supra note 127, at 744; see also
ROSENNE, supra note 21, at 27–33. 
132. LEAGUE OF NATIONS ADVISORY COMM. JURISTS, supra note 127, at 744; see also 
ROSENNE, supra note 21, at 27–33.
133. See also KAIKOBAD, supra note 18, at 245–47 (outlining these debates concerning 
the time limit for bringing an application for revision).
134. LEAGUE OF NATIONS ADVISORY COMM. JURISTS, supra note 127, at 744. 
135. Preparation of the Rules of Court of January 30th 1922, 1921 P.C.I.J. (ser. D) No. 
2, at 103.
136. Id.
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The first rules of court were adopted by the PCIJ in its preliminary ses-
sion on March 24, 1922. It was agreed that an application for the purposes 
of article 61(1) was to be made “in the same form as the application men-
tioned in article 40 of the Statute;”
138
that is, in the same form as an applica-
tion instituting fresh proceedings. Moreover, for the purposes of article 
61(3), the court could make a “special order rendering the admission of an 
application conditional upon previous compliance with the terms of the 
judgment impeached.”
139
The 1922 Rules also contained a separate provi-
sion for the court (or president if the court was not sitting) to unilaterally 
correct an error in a judgment arising from a “slip or accidental omis-
sion.”
140
This provision was deleted in 1934 and never used.
141
During the drafting of the rules, the Judges Altamira and Loder, as well 
as the Secretariat, amongst others, each submitted a memorandum setting 
out proposals for the court’s procedure. Judge Altamira proposed that upon 
receipt of an application for revision, the original case be reopened and re-
argued after the court had decided that a new fact had been discovered.
142
Judge Loder and the Secretariat, by contrast, proposed that proceedings in 
revision should be treated as a new case.
143
Shabtai Rosenne suggests this 
latter approach, which was adopted by the court, aims at preserving the “fi-
nality of the original res judicata”144 while revision proceedings are out-
standing. However, the procedural interaction between the old (impeached) 
case and the new case is not addressed. Unlike in a case of interpretation, 
137. Or if it was, those thoughts have not been recorded for posterity. As noted by James 
Brown Scott, there were three unofficial and unrecorded meetings dedicated to rules of proce-
dure, on which “substantial agreement was reached,” with the results of those discussions be-
ing “silently incorporated in the finished project.” JAMES BROWN SCOTT, THE PROJECT OF A 
PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND RESOLUTIONS OF THE ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE OF JURISTS: REPORT AND COMMENTARY 11 (1920); see also Ole Spiermann, 
Who Attempts Too Much Does Nothing Well: The 1920 Advisory Committee of Jurists and the 
Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 2002 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L 187.
138. Rules of Court (adopted March 24, 1922), 1922 P.C.I.J. (ser. D) No. 1, art. 61.
139. Id. 
140. Id. art. 75.
141. Elaboration of the Rules of Court of March 11th, 1936, 1936 P.C.I.J. (ser. D) No. 2, 
app. 3, at 603; see also Application for Revision and Interpretation of the Judgment of 24 Feb-
ruary 1982 in the Case concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunis./Libya), Judgment, 1985 I.C.J. 
Rep. 192, ¶ 198 (Dec. 10) (“The Court does of course have the power to correct, in one of its 
judgments, any mistakes which might be described as “erreurs matérielles”. That power 
would not normally be exercised by way of a judgment since the very nature of the correction 
of such an error excludes any element of contentious procedure.”).
142. Preparation of the Rules of Court, 1922 P.C.I.J. (ser. D) No. 2, at 280.
143. Id. at 250.
144. ROSENNE, supra note 21, at 53; see also Karel Wellens, The International Court of 
Justice, Back to the Future: Keeping the Dream Alive, 64 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 193, 207 
(2017); Jessica Joly Hébert, Distinguishing Interpretation and Revision Proceedings at the 
International Court of Justice, 19 L. & PRAC. INT’L CTS. & TRIBS. 200, 222–23 (2020).
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where the original res judicata remains unchanged,145 in a case of revision, 
the original res judicata is replaced, but that replacement may not extend to 
the entirety of the original decision.
146
If the revision is treated as a new 
case, the result is intolerable double jeopardy. On the other hand, if revision 
is treated—as it is in domestic courts—as a procedure for reopening and 
variation, there is no confusion regarding the original judgment’s status.
This anomaly was not addressed in later iterations of the rules. Rather, a 
new complication was added in 1926 with the creation of a new procedure 
for separating preliminary objections from the merits,
147
which can be seen 
in Mavrommatis148 and Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia.149
The introduction of preliminary objections added two complications for 
the revision procedure. The first complication was a short-lived provision 
requiring that objections to the court’s jurisdiction to revise a judgment 
should be addressed as preliminary objections in accordance with the new 
article 38.
150
This provision did not survive past the 1936 Rules. The second 
and much more important complication, which still remains today, is 
whether a separate decision on preliminary objections “constitutes a res ju-
dicata in the proper sense of that term,”151 and is therefore subject to revi-
sion. The issue did not confront the PCIJ, as no requests for revision were 
brought any time from its inaugural sitting in 1922 until its dissolution in 
1946.
152
The implications for the present court are discussed in Part IV, be-
low.
145. Theinel & Zimmermann, supra note 67.
146. Application for Revision and Interpretation of the Judgment of 24 February 1982 in 
the Case concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunis./Libya), Judgment, 1985 I.C.J. Rep. 192, ¶
247 (Dec. 10) (separate opinion by Bastid, J.); see also KAIKOBAD, supra note 18, at 313.
147. Elaboration of the Rules of Court of March 11th, 1936, 1936 P.C.I.J. (ser. D) No. 2, 
add. 3, at 282.
148. The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U.K.), Jurisdiction, 1924
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2 (Aug. 30).
149. Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Ger. v. Pol.), Preliminary Objec-
tions, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 6. (Aug. 25).
150. ROSENNE, supra note 21, at 55.
151. South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), Second Phase, 1966 I.C.J. 
Rep. 6, ¶ 59 (July 18). 
152. The Permanent Court of International Justice (“PCIJ”) did very briefly discuss revi-
sion in two of its advisory opinions. In one case, the PCIJ appeared to indicate that the power 
of revision is inherent. Authors disagree and international judicial practice is inconsistent re-
garding this question. See Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations 
Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, 1954 I.C.J. Rep. 47, 55 (July 13). Bowett, con-
siders revision not to be an inherent power. BOWETT, supra note 3, at 590. Brown takes the 
opposite view. Chester Brown, The Inherent Powers of International Courts and Tribunals,
2005 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L 195, 218; see also Question of the Monastery of Saint-Naoum (Al-
banian Frontier), Advisory Opinion, 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 9, ¶ 64 (Sept. 4) (“The Court 
refers to what it has already said regarding the definitive character of the decision in question, 
and does not feel called upon to give an opinion on the question whether such decisions can –-
except when an express reservation to that effect has been made - be revised in the event of 
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E. Revision at the ICJ
In 1945, the San Francisco Conference received no proposals for 
amendments to article 61 of the Statute, nor was there any discussion of the 
reasons for continuing with it.
153
This is perhaps surprising given that the 
utility of a completely neglected procedure must surely have been open to 
question. The revision procedure was slightly amended in the 1946 Rules, 
with the addition of a paragraph stating that the court, if it admits the appli-
cation for revision, “will determine the written procedure required for exam-
ining the merits of the application.”
154
The effect of this change served only 
to emphasize the two-stage procedure already demanded by article 61. Save 
for renumbering, the rules relating to revision were untouched in 1972.
155
When the court adopted a completely new set of rules in 1978,
156
there had 
still been no application for revision, and so the court had no experience to 
draw on. The 1978 Rule is merely “in the main a clearer rendering of the 
fundamental procedural requirements of previous versions of the Rules.”
157
In substance, the procedure under the rules for instituting revision of a 
judgment is the same as it has been since 1922.
III.  Revision Proper or Revision Simulacra: Charting the 
Court’s Approach
As noted above, the court has only dealt with three cases of revision 
proper, applying article 61, since it was set up in 1945. Geiß observes that 
certain kinds of territorial disputes tend to characterize revision cases,
158
but 
the existence of an essential error being proved, or of new facts being relied on. But even if 
revision under such conditions were admissible, these conditions are not present in the case 
before the Court.”); id. ¶ 66 (“fresh documents do not in themselves amount to fresh facts”). 
This issue presented significant challenges for parties in a later ICJ proceeding, but that is be-
yond the scope of this chapter. See Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 September 
1992 in the Case Concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal./Hond.), 
Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. Rep. 392, ¶ 31 (Sept. 11).
153. See generally Report of the Informal Inter-Allied Committee on the Future of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice, 39 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (1945).
154. International Court of Justice Registry, International Court of Justice: Amended 
Rules of the Court, 11 I.L.M. 899, art. 78.
155. Rules of Court, 1978 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. 99; see also International Court of Justice 
Registry, International Court of Justice: Amended Rules of the Court, 11 I.L.M. 899; Shabtai 
Rosenne, The 1972 Revision of the Rules of the International Court of Justice, 8 ISR. L. REV.
197 (1973); Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, The Amendments to the Rules of Procedure of the 
International Court of Justice, 67 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (1973).
156. See generally SHABTAI ROSENNE, PROCEDURE IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT; A
COMMENTARY ON THE 1978 RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 1 (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers 1983).
157. ROSENNE, supra note 21, at 68.
158. Robin Geiß, Revision Proceedings Before the International Court of Justice, 63
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT 167, 175 
(2003); see also KAIKOBAD, supra note 18, at 235.
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for the court, this has not been the only context in which applications for re-
vision arise. In addition, there have been cases that might be considered re-
vision simulacra – instances where the court has reconsidered a judgment 
but without an application of article 61. Some of these cases manifest the 
potential problems identified in the drafting history above. In particular, 
these include the importance of the conceptual distinction between revision 
and annulment; the intersection between preliminary objections and revi-
sion; and the effect of the court’s decision in 1922 to treat revision, proce-
durally, as a new case.
A. Revision Proper
1. Tunisia v. Libya
Tunisia v. Libya combined requests for revision, interpretation, and the 
“correction” of an error.
159
The original case was brought pursuant to a 1978 
special agreement and concerned the delimitation of the continental shelf 
between Libya and Tunisia.
160
As with many delimitation cases, the 1982 
judgment was detailed and technical.
161
Each state had granted various pe-
troleum concessions in the Mediterranean, and the geographical placement 
of these concessions and their apparent congruence was relied on by the 
court in the determination of the appropriate delimitation line.
162
In its application for revision, Tunisia submitted that there was, no 
commonality in the lines of the states’ petroleum concessions. This was the 
“new fact,”
163
which had only been discovered upon Tunisia unearthing a 
resolution of the Libyan Council of Ministers setting the boundary of Lib-
ya’s 1968 concession at twenty-four degrees east of north. Tunisia argued 
the apparent convergence of the states’ petroleum concession boundaries 
was “a decisive factor in the court’s judgment.”
164
The court held that, while the exact coordinates of the Libyan conces-
sion were not known to the court or to Tunisia, they were readily obtainable 
by Tunisia, had proper inquiries been made, and it was in Tunisia’s own in-
159. Application for Revision and Interpretation of the Judgment of 24 February 1982 in 
the Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunis./Libya), Judgment, 1985 I.C.J. Rep. 192, ¶
53 (Dec. 10) (sidestepping the question of whether it had jurisdiction to correct “erreurs maté-
rielles” by finding that Tunisia’s application in this respect was “based upon a misreading of 
the Judgment, and has thus become without object.” The Court held therefore there was “no
need . . . to examine the wider question of the correction of an error in a judgment.” As noted 
above, the jurisdiction to correct a genuine error is common in domestic courts.).
160. Case Concerning the Continental Shelf, 1985 I.C.J. Rep. 192 ¶¶ 32–34.
161. WILLIAM MICHAEL REISMAN & CHRISTINA PARAJON SKINNER, FRAUDULENT 
EVIDENCE BEFORE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS: THE DIRTY STORIES OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 78 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2014).
162. Case Concerning the Continental Shelf, 1985 I.C.J. Rep. 192 ¶ 203 (Dec. 10).
163. Id. ¶ 21.
164. Id. ¶ 16.
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terest to have obtained them. In other words, “one of the essential conditions 
of admissibility of a request for revision” was lacking, as Tunisia had been 
negligent in failing to ascertain the north-western boundary of the Libyan 
petroleum concession.
165
Moreover, “the line resulting from the grant of the 
concession was . . . by no means the sole consideration taken into account 
by the Court.”
166
As such, it did not constitute a “decisive factor” in the orig-
inal decision. The court, rather, held that “the details of the correct coordi-
nates of Concession No. 137 would not have changed the decision of the 
Court as to the first sector of the delimitation.”
167
Despite it being the first revision case in the court’s history, the judges 
had little to say on the function served by the procedure. Only Judge ad hoc
Bastid was inspired to comment on the implications of a revision, noting:
The Statute of the Court, while laying down the conditions of admissi-
bility of an application for revision, is silent as to the effects of that applica-
tion if deemed admissible. What would it imply to reopen the merits of a 
case, and to what extent should the case as a whole be reviewed?
168
She continued by observing that a request for revision was one of ut-
most gravity,
169
and, as such, strictness in weighing the question of admissi-
bility was vital.
170 Ad hoc Judge Bastid’s views signify a cautious approach, 
emphasizing the importance of the consequences of a revision, while at the 
same time due regard for “the parties” situation as sovereign States.’
171 Ad 
hoc Judge Bastid’s reflections mirror the unanswered questions raised dur-
ing the drafting of the 1922 Rules.
172
2. El Salvador v. Honduras
In this case, Honduras questioned whether the new documentary evi-
dence as to the course of the River Goascorán constituted a “new fact” or 
was instead a new interpretation of a previously known fact.
173
Honduras ar-
165. Id. ¶ 28. 
166. Id. ¶ 35.
167. Id. ¶ 39; see also Alexander Orakhelashvili, The International Court and its Free-
dom to Select the Ground Upon Which it Will Base its Judgment, 56 INT’L & COMPAR. L.Q.
171, 175–76 (2007).
168. Application for Revision and Interpretation of the Judgment of 24 February 1982 in 
the Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunis./Libya), 1985 I.C.J. Rep. 247, ¶ 2 (Dec. 10) 
(separate opinion by Bastid J.).
169. Id. ¶ 3.
170. Id. 
171. Id.
172. See Preparation of the Rules of Court of January 30th 2022, 1921 P.C.I.J. (ser. D) 
No. 2, at 280; Rosenne, supra note 21, at 53
173. There was a minor side conflict as to whether El Salvador had complied with the 
concomitate time limit of six months since the date of discovery of the allegedly new fact, but 
it was not taken up by the Court. Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 September 
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gued that there is a distinction between “the facts alleged and the evidence 
relied upon to prove them.”
174
Rather than taking the opportunity to clarify 
the meaning of “new facts,” the revision chamber elided this issue by pro-
ceeding on the basis of an assumption that the “alleged facts” were indeed 
“new facts,” and focused its analysis on whether they were of such a nature 
as to be decisive factors. In the chamber’s view, they were not. Rather, the 
new map did “not overturn the conclusions arrived at . . . in 1992; it bears 
them out.”
175
The chamber also addressed the issue of whether an applica-
tion for revision could be admissible based on the agreement of the parties; 
the answer was a clear no. The chamber held that “regardless of the parties” 
views on admissibility, it is for the court “to ascertain whether the admissi-
bility requirements laid down in Article 61 of the Statute are met.”
176
Again, the chamber emphasized the need to take a strict approach to the 
admissibility requirements of article 61
177
but otherwise made no comment 
on the general function or purpose of revision. Ad hoc Judge Paolillo, in dis-
sent, made a number of relevant observations; in particular, “an application 
for revision is by its very nature and object exceptional.”
178
Furthermore, 
this dissenting opinion observed that there exists:
a negative perception of the institution of revision, which is viewed 
as a means of breaching the sacrosanct principle of res judicata. 
According to this view, revision is a substitute for appeal and as 
such represents a threat to legal certainty.
179
El Salvador v. Honduras also raised an interesting point of procedure. 
In the original case Nicaragua had appeared as an intervener
180
but was not 
before the chamber during the revision proceedings.
181
The nature of the re-
lationship between an intervener and a revision judgment is not at all clear 
from the statute, rules, or the court’s jurisprudence. Rosenne suggests that 
an intervener cannot initiate revision proceedings, but can request permis-
1992 in the Case Concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal./Hond.), 
Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. Rep. 392, ¶ 36 (Sept. 11). 
174. Id. ¶ 31; see also Question of the Monastery of Saint-Naoum (Albanian Frontier), 
Advisory Opinion, 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 9 (Sept. 4).
175. Case Concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute, 2003 I.C.J. Rep. 
392, ¶ 53.
176. Id. ¶ 59.
177. Id. ¶ 22 .
178. Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 September 1992 in the Case Con-
cerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal./Hond.), 2003 I.C.J. Rep. 413, 
¶ 32 (Dec. 18) (Paolillo J., dissenting).
179. Id. ¶ 30 
180. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 62, Oct. 24, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S. 
993.
181. Nicaragua was supplied with a copy of the revision application but did not appear 
in the proceedings or make any submissions. 
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sion to intervene, again, under article 62.
182
For present purposes, as it has 
been the court’s consistent practice to treat applications for revision as new 
cases, Rosenne’s approach, at first, appears logical. But, as argued below, 
treating revision as a new and separate proceeding is not procedurally neu-
tral. It leads to potentially absurd outcomes, such as an intervener having to 
reapply and re-establish its legal interest, and the court having to re-decide 
this issue.
3. Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Serbia & Montenegro (Genocide)
The third case of revision proper was Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Yugo-
slavia, one of the most procedurally complex matters to have ever come be-
fore the court.
183
Commenced in 1993, Yugoslavia had filed preliminary ob-
jections to the jurisdiction and to the admissibility of the case. On July 11, 
1996, the court dismissed those objections and proceeded to the merits 
phase, accepting that it had jurisdiction to hear the case pursuant to article 
IX of the Genocide Convention.
184
Yugoslavia submitted its counter-
memorial in 1997, including a number of counterclaims that were subse-
quently withdrawn on April 20, 2001. The matter concluded with a judg-
ment on the merits, issued in 2007.
In the meantime, on November 1, 2000, the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia (Serbia & Montenegro) (“FRY”) was admitted to membership of the 
United Nations. Yugoslavia had ceased to exist,
185
but, for many years, FRY 
had asserted its status as the successor state, claiming it would “strictly 
abide by all the commitments that [Yugoslavia] assumed internationally.”
186
Despite this, and having come to the view that FRY was in fact not the suc-
cessor to Yugoslavia’s international obligations, in April 2001, FRY filed an 
application for revision of the preliminary objections judgment and request-
ed the suspension of the merits proceedings.
187
FRY argued inter alia that 
182. ROSENNE, supra note 21, at 169–70.
183. For a detailed account, see Karin Oellers-Frahm, The Principle of Consent to Inter-
national Jurisdiction - Is It Still Alive: Observations on the Judgment on Preliminary Objec-
tions in the Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), 2009 GER. Y.B. INT’L L. 487.
184. Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevision and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections, 1996 
I.C.J. Rep. 595, ¶ 47 (June 26).
185. S.C. Res. 777 (Sept. 19, 1992).
186. Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 July 1996 in the Case Concerning 
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Yugoslavia v. Bosn. & Herz.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. Rep. 7, ¶ 1 (Feb. 3).
187. See Institution of Proceedings, Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 July 
1996 in the Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugoslavia), INT’L CT. J. (Apr. 24, 2001),
https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/122/institution-proceedings. In May 2001 the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (Serbia & Montenegro) (“FRY”) also submitted to the Court a document titled 
“Initiative to the Court to Reconsider ex Officio Jurisdiction over Yugoslavia”, which argued 
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because it had not continued the legal personality of the former Yugoslavia, 
it was impossible for FRY to have been a party to the Genocide Convention, 
and there was no alternative basis for the court’s jurisdiction.
The court refused FRY’s request to suspend the merits proceedings.
188
The revision proceedings were entered in the General List as a new case, as 
has been the practice. But this seemingly innocuous administrative detail 
now takes on a profound importance because the impugned decision is not a 
final judgment on the merits but an interlocutory decision on jurisdiction. 
To begin with, the court’s decision in this respect seems to contravene if not 
the letter then at least the spirit of what is now article 79bis(4) of the court’s 
rules, requiring that when preliminary objections are entered, the proceed-
ings on the merits are (“shall be”) suspended. This article (which has existed 
since the 1936 iteration of the PCIJ Rules) promotes the efficient use of the 
court and the parties’ resources. It ensures the court does not act on the mer-
its without the authority to do so.
By ignoring this article in respect of FRY’s application for revision, and 
indeed by permitting an application for revision of an interlocutory decision 
in the first place, the court rendered a potentially absurd outcome whereby it 
can hand down a decision on the merits, deciding a matter res judicata, and 
yet not have had the legal authority to do so. Moreover, the court failed to 
grapple with the fact that the remedy for a judicial act ultra vires is not revi-
sion, but annulment. These matters are returned to in Part IV, below.
In 2003, the court rejected FRY’s application for revision as inadmissi-
ble on the rather tenuous and highly contested
189
basis that FRY did not “re-
ly on facts that existed in 1996” but rather on “the legal consequences which 
it seeks to draw from facts subsequent to the Judgment which it is asking to 
have revised.”
190 Ad hoc Judge Dimitrijevi , in dissent, called it “an attempt 
to dispose of the case ‘epistemologically,’ by restrictively interpreting the 
meaning of the term ‘fact’ as used in Article 61.”
191
Together with the judg-
that the Court had no jurisdiction ratione personae over FRY and requesting that the Court 
“suspend proceedings regarding the merits of the case.” Rather than suspend the merits, FRY
was granted the opportunity to address the matter of jurisdiction during the oral phase of the 
merits proceedings. See “Initiative to the Court to Reconsider Ex Officio Jurisdiction over 
Yugoslavia”, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), INT’L CT. J. (May 4, 2001),
https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/91/other-documents; see also ROSENNE, supra note 21, at 135.
188. ROSENNE, supra note 21, at 135. 
189. See Matthew Craven, The Bosnia Case Revisited and the New Yugoslavia, 15
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 323 (2002); Vojin Dimitrijevi  & Marko Milanovi , The Strange Story of 
the Bosnian Genocide Case, 21 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 65 (2008).
190. Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 July 1996 in the Case Concerning 
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
2003 I.C.J. Rep. 7, pmbl. 
191. Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 July 1996 in the Case Concerning 
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Yugoslavia v. Bosn. & Herz.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. Rep. 53, ¶ 1 (Feb. 3) (Dimitrijevi , J., 
dissenting).
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ment in El Salvador, the Genocide case decision on revision illustrates the 
complexity of defining, as Karnebeek noted in 1899, the scope and limits of 
what constitutes a “new fact.”
192
 
In 2017, Bosnia & Herzegovina applied for revision of the 2007 merits 
judgment, but the basis of the application is not on public record. Before the 
case was entered in the List, the court determined that the Agent submitting 
the application, Mr. Sakib Softi , had not been validly appointed and, as 
such, the court had not been properly seized.
193




This incident highlights in yet another form the essential procedural 
question of whether revision proceedings should be treated as a new case.
195
 
While Mr. Softi  had represented Bosnia & Herzegovina as Agent in the 
original proceedings, because the court treated the revision application as a 
new and different case, a new appointment as Agent was required. This too 
is considered in greater depth in Part IV, below. 
B.  Revision Simulacra 
In addition to the three cases detailed above, the court has also faced 
two incidents of revision simulacrum — cases that raise similar issues to re-
vision. The first involved the “examination” of an earlier judgement,
196
 and 





 192. HAGUE 1899, supra note 82, at 750. 
 193. International Court of Justice Press Release No. 2017/12, Document Entitled “Ap-
plication for Revision of the Judgment of 26 February 2007 in the Case Concerning the Ap-
plication of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia)” - Statement by H.E. Judge Ronny Abraham, President of 
the International Court of Justice (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.icj-cij.org/files/press-
releases/0/000-20170309-PRE-01-00-EN.pdf. 
 194. Although, as noted by Milanovic: “the Court was perfectly aware that if it allowed 
the revision case to proceed now, the case actually had zero prospects for success. When I say 
zero, I don’t mean just low or unlikely, but a zero ‘unless a majority of the judges had a sei-
zure’ kind of zero.” Marko Milanovic, The Strangest ICJ Case Got Even Stranger, Or the Re-
vision That Wasn’t, EJIL: TALK! (March 13, 2017), https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-strangest-icj-
case-got-even-stranger-or-the-revision-that-wasnt/. 
 195. Geiß & Zimmermann, supra note 21, at 1666; see also Dapo Akande, Applications 
for Revision of the International Court of Justice’s Judgments: The Curious “Case” for Revi-
sion of the Bosnian Genocide Judgment, EJIL: TALK! (March 13, 2017), 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/applications-for-revision-of-the-international-court-of-justice-
judgments-the-curious-case-for-revision-of-the-bosnian-genocide-judgment/.  
 196. Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of 
the Court’s Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.) Case Order, 
1995 I.C.J. Rep. 288 (Sept. 22). 
 197. South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), Second Phase, 1966 I.C.J. 
Rep. 6 (July 18). 
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1. New Zealand v. France
In New Zealand v. France, on August 21, 1995, New Zealand filed a 
“Request for an Examination of the Situation” — a procedure unknown to 
the Statute and Rules. The Request was brought on the basis of the court’s 
1974 judgments in the Nuclear Tests cases,198 which stated inter alia, “if the 
basis of this Judgment were to be affected, the Applicant could request an 
examination of the situation in accordance with the provisions of the Stat-
ute.”
199
The original case concerned a claim for the cessation of nuclear test-
ing. France did not appear before the court, but unilateral statements made 
by the French authorities undertook that such testing would cease. The court 
considered that “the objective of the Applicant has in effect been accom-
plished, inasmuch as the Court finds that France has undertaken the obliga-
tion to hold no further nuclear tests in the atmosphere in the South Pacif-
ic.”
200
As such, the court issued a Judgment that was in effect a non-
decision. It held in the dispositif that “the claim of New Zealand no longer 
has any object and that the Court is therefore not called upon to give a deci-
sion thereon.”
201
While France did cease atmospheric nuclear testing, it announced plans 
in 1995 for a series of underground nuclear tests at the Mururoa and Fanga-
taufa atolls. New Zealand’s original case “concerned nuclear contamination 
of the environment arising from nuclear testing of whatever nature”
202
and 
as such, the government of New Zealand considered the situation to warrant 
a “resumption of the case begun by Application on 9 May 1973.”
203
In 1995, the use of the phrase “in accordance with the provisions of the 
Statute” in the original Judgment had caused the parties significant conster-
nation. New Zealand was adamant that it was “not seeking an interpretation 
of the 1974 Judgment under Article 60 of the Statute, nor a revision of that 
Judgment under Article 61.”
204
Rather, the proceedings were “derivative”;
205
“part of the same case and not of a new one.”
206
By contrast, France argued 
that New Zealand’s request was one to “reopen . . . proceedings declared 
closed by the Court,”
207
and that the action by New Zealand was “more akin 
198. Nuclear Tests Case (N.Z. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 457, ¶ 63 (Dec. 20); 
Nuclear Tests Case (Austl. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 253, ¶ 60 (Dec. 20). 
199. Nuclear Tests Case (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. Rep ¶ 63.
200. Id. ¶ 55.
201. Id. ¶ 75.
202. Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of 
the Court’s Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Order, 1995 
I.C.J. Rep. 288, ¶ 4 (Sept. 22).
203. Id. ¶ 3. 
204. Id. ¶ 50.
205. Id. ¶ 48.
206. Id. ¶ 49. 
207. Id. ¶ 40.
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to a request for revision.”
208
An application for revision under article 61 was 
manifestly inadmissible as the ten-year time limit had passed long before. 
As such, France argued that New Zealand should have brought either an ap-
plication for interpretation under article 60 or simply filed a new application 
under article 40(1).
209
The court’s decision with respect to the procedure of the Request is 
sparse. The court held:
in expressly laying down, in paragraph 63 of its Judgment of 20 
December 1974, that, in the circumstances set out therein, “the Ap-
plicant could request an examination of the situation in accordance 
with the provisions of the Statute,” the Court cannot have intended 
to limit the Applicant’s access to legal procedures such as the filing 
of a new application (Statute, Art. 40, para. l), a request for inter-
pretation (Statute, Art. 60) or a request for revision (Statute, Art. 
61), which would have been open to it in any event;
Whereas by inserting the above-mentioned words in paragraph 63 
of its Judgment, the Court did not exclude a special procedure, in 
the event that the circumstances in the paragraph were to arise, in 
other words, circumstances which “affected” the “basis” of the 
Judgment.
210
The court further held that the Request, while a permissible ad hoc pro-
cedure, was not made out insofar as the 1974 Judgment “dealt exclusively 
with atmospheric nuclear tests”
211
and not underground testing. This deci-
sion ignores the fact that “New Zealand’s previous application had been 
founded on the harm caused to the South Pacific environment by nuclear 
testing . . .”
212
Returning to the matter of the procedure, the court was unanimous as to 
the validity of the request. The three dissenting Judges concurred on this 
point. Judge Weeramantry considered the request to be “unusual,”
213
but le-
gitimate, as the court had “used its undoubted powers of regulating its own 
procedure to devise a procedure sui generis.”214 Judge Weeramantry further 
posited that there was “no merit in the submission that an application under 
paragraph 63 is an application for revision under another guise. The two 
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. ¶¶ 53–54. 
211. Id. ¶ 63.
212. Surabhi Ranganathan, Nuclear Weapons and the Court, 111 AM. J. INT’L L.
UNBOUND 88, 88 (2017).
213. Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of 
Court’s Judgment of 20 December 1974 in Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Order, 1995 I.C.J. 288, 
320 (Sept. 22) (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
214. Id. at 320 (Judge ad hoc Palmer stated the same view at 399 and expressed his gen-
eral agreement with the opinion of Judge Weeramantry at 421).
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procedures are totally different in conception, nature and operation.”
215
Judge Koroma likewise stated that “paragraph 63 did not anticipate the dis-
covery of new facts but rather provided for an examination of the subject-
matter of the Judgment.”
216
Putting aside the expiration of the time limit, could the request be con-
ceived as an application for revision? First, it is arguable that there was a 
discovery of a new fact — essentially, that underground testing was just as 
harmful to the environment as atmospheric testing. This fact was true in 
1974 but, due to the limitations in scientific understanding, could not be 
known. As observed by New Zealand in its written submissions, if the court 
had known this it “could hardly have taken the view that the French renun-
ciation of atmospheric testing could by itself have brought the “dispute” to 
an end.”
217
Second, the fact must be a decisive factor. In this respect, there is no 
distinction between a fact that may be a decisive factor in a judgment, and a 
situation that could arise to “affect the basis of the Judgment,” as Judge 
Weeramantry posits.
218
However, Judge Weeramantry goes on to draw the 
following distinction:
[R]evision involves an alteration or modification of the Judgment, 
whereas the Court’s action was aimed at preserving the Judgment 
in its full integrity, in the event that some event had occurred which 
undermined the basis of the Judgment.
219
I would suggest that “preserving” the Judgment was not the intention of 
the court, given that no decision was made. Rather, the court appears to 
have been attempting to reserve to itself the option of making a decision in 
the future. In this respect, as observed by Judge ad hoc Palmer, it was “an 
unusual Judgment of which it might be said that proceedings were not defi-
nitely ended.”
220
Bearing in mind that the 1974 Judgment had not conclu-
sively ruled on whether the court had jurisdiction over the dispute, the intent 
behind paragraph 63 appears to have been to preserve the prima facie juris-
diction of the court.
215. Id. at 321.
216. Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of 
Court’s Judgment of 20 December 1974 in Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Order, 1995 I.C.J. 288, 
363, 376 (Sept. 22) (Koroma, J., dissenting).
217. Application, Request for an Examination of Situation, Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 
(May 9, 1973), https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/97/7187.pdf.
218. Request for an Examination of Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the 
Court’s Judgment of 20 December 1974 in Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Order, 1995 I.C.J. 288, 
321 (Sept. 22) (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
219. Id. at 320.
220. Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of 
Court’s Judgment of 20 December 1974 in Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Order, 1995 I.C.J. 288, 
382, 398 (Sept. 22) (Palmer, J., dissenting).
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For this reason, the Request cannot be considered as a revision. There 
was no decision in 1974,
221
no res judicata in respect of the issues raised in 
New Zealand’s 1973 Application.
222
As such, there was nothing to revise. 
However, the approach taken by the court to the Request is informative.
As noted by Judge ad hoc Palmer, “the formal fact of the status of the 
case on the Court’s formal list is irrelevant.”
223
Technically, the Nuclear 
Tests case was treated as concluded and removed from the List. The Re-
quest was entered as a new case in the List. But, as submitted by New Zea-
land and accepted by the court, the Request proceedings were not a new 
case. Rather, they were derivative,
224
“part of the same case and not of a new 
one.”
225
The original case had in fact been resumed. As explained in Part IV 
below, there is no reason not to conceive of revision cases in the same man-
ner.
However, to raise a point of distinction, it must be observed that the de-
cision on the Request comes in the form of an order in accordance with arti-
cle 48 of the Statute,
226
rather than a judgment: Revision proceedings are 
always dealt with by judgment, as mandated by article 61. This could sug-
gest that revision proceedings are a distinct, new case with a new judgment. 
But it is not conclusive; there is no particular reason that proceedings must 
end with a judgment rather than an order (domestic lawyers would be famil-
iar with an order for costs following judgment), nor does a separate judg-
ment following a decision on the merits of necessity indicate that the matter 
under consideration is separate from the original proceedings.
227
2. South West Africa
Another incident of revision simulacrum arose in the notorious South 
West Africa (Second Phase) judgment. In 1960, the court received two sepa-
221. See Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. 457, ¶ 62 (Dec. 20). (“It does 
not enter into the adjudicatory functions of the Court to deal with issues in abstracto, once it 
has reached the conclusion that the merits of the case no longer fall to be determined. The ob-
ject of the claim having disappeared, there is nothing on which to give judgment.”).
222. Request for an Examination of Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of 
Court’s Judgment of 20 December 1974 in Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Order, 1995 I.C.J. 288, 
377 (Sept. 22) (Koroma, J., dissenting).
223. Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of 
Court’s Judgment of 20 December 1974 in Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Order, 1995 I.C.J. 288, 
382, 399 (Sept. 22) (Palmer, J., dissenting).
224. Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of 
Court’s Judgment of 20 December 1974 in Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Order, 1995 I.C.J. 288, 
302–03 (Sept. 22). 
225. Id.
226. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 48 (“The Court shall make or-
ders for the conduct of the case, shall decide the form and time in which each party must con-
clude its arguments, and make all arrangements connected with the taking of evidence.”).
227. See, e.g., Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Compensation, 1949 I.C.J. 390, 392 (July 
28).
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rate Applications from Ethiopia and Liberia, each instituting proceedings 
against South Africa relating to the Mandate for South West Africa. The 
Class C Mandate had been created under the auspices of the League of Na-
tions, whereby South Africa, as Mandatory, was permitted to apply South 
African law to the territory and treat South West Africa as an integral por-
tion of its own territory. The claim related to the duties and performance of 
South Africa as Mandatory.
228
The Applications invoked article 7 of the 
Mandate
229
and article 37 of the Statute
230
as the basis of the court’s jurisdic-
tion. The court joined the proceedings,
231
which were then met with prelimi-
nary objections from South Africa. South Africa argued that Ethiopia and 
Liberia lacked standing to bring the case,
232
and the Mandate for South West 
Africa was no longer in force,
233
despite the court having held in its three 
1950s Advisory Opinions that South West Africa was still a mandated terri-
tory.
234
South Africa also asserted there was no dispute between the par-
ties.
235
In 1962, the court rejected all of South Africa’s contentions and held 
that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate on the merits of the dispute.
236
In 1966, the Court could have addressed the merits of the case. Instead, 
the court returned to two questions of jurisdiction that it considered as hav-
ing an “antecedent character.”
237
First, the court considered whether the 
Mandate continued to be in force,
238
notwithstanding that in 1962 the court 
228. South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.), Preliminary Objection, 1962 I.C.J. 319, 321 
(Dec. 21).
229. Mandate for German South-West Africa, League of Nations Doc. C.1920 (1920) 
art. 7 (“The Mandatory agrees that, if any dispute whatever should arise between the Manda-
tory and another Member of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or the applica-
tion of the provisions of the Mandate, such a dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, 
shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice.”).
230. See Statute ICJ, supra note 2, art. 37 (“Whenever a treaty or convention in force 
provides for reference of a matter to a tribunal to have been instituted by the League of Na-
tions, or to the Permanent Court of International Justice, the matter shall, as between the par-
ties to the present Statute, be referred to the International Court of Justice.”).
231. South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.), Order, 1961 I.C.J. 4, 4–5 (Dec. 5).
232. South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.), Preliminary Objection, 1962 I.C.J. 319, 326 
(Dec. 21). 
233. Id. at 326–27. 
234. International Status of South-West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 128 (July 
11); Voting Procedure on Questions Relating to Reports and Petitions Concerning Territory of 
South-West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1955 I.C.J. 67 (June 7); Admissibility of Hearings of 
Petitioners by the Committee on South West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1956 I.C.J. 23 (June 
1). For a general history and overview of the cases, see generally Makane Moïse Mbengue & 
Najib Messihi, The South West Africa Cases: 50 Years Later, 1 ETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 11
(2016).
235. South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.), Preliminary Objection, 1962 I.C.J. 319, 327 
(Dec. 21).
236. Id. at 347. 
237. South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.), Second Phase, 1966 I.C.J. Rep. 6, 18 (July 18).
238. Id. at 19. 
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had held that it did.
239
Second, the court returned to the question of standing. 
The court stated that the 1962 Judgment had only addressed the question of 
Ethiopia and Liberia’s standing “before the Court itself”,
240
and not their 
“legal right or interest in the subject-matter of their claim.”
241
The court held 
that individual members of the League of Nations were not to be regarded 
as having their own legal right or interest in the administration of the Man-
date; only the League itself could bring an action concerning the perfor-
mance of the Mandate.
242
The two judgments are clearly inconsistent.
243
For present purposes, the 
point of interest is Reisman’s thesis that the second phase of South West Af-
rica constitutes a revision of the 1962 Judgment, notwithstanding that the 
court did not follow the procedure laid down in article 61.
244
Reisman argues 
that the matter of Ethiopia and Liberia’s “legal right or interest” was defini-
tively settled in 1962, in favor of the applicants,
245
and was res judicata.246
As such, the court was obliged to follow that decision “unless it specifically 
resorted to the revision procedure . . . including a judgment expressly re-
cording the existence of a ‘new fact’.”
247
Reisman explains that the court’s 
failure to follow the article 61 procedure was “a severe denial of justice” 
and “an act in excess of jurisdiction”;
248
an excès de pouvoir. Thus, there 
were “compelling grounds for nullity” of the 1966 decision.
249
This analysis raises a number of interesting questions, most pertinent of 
which is the status of decisions on preliminary objections as res judicata. In 
South West Africa, the court opined that it was unnecessary to decide on 
“whether a decision on a preliminary objection constitutes a res judicata in 
the proper sense of that term, whether it ranks as a “decision” for the pur-
poses of article 59 of the court’s Statute, or as “final” within the meaning of 
239. South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.), Preliminary Objection, 1962 I.C.J. 319, 347 
(Dec. 21) (“The Court concludes that Article 7 of the Mandate is a treaty or convention still in 
force within the meaning of Article 37 of the Statute of the Court and that the dispute is one 
which is envisaged in the said Article 7 and cannot be settled by negotiation. Consequently, 
the Court is competent to hear the dispute on the merits.”).
240. South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), Preliminary Objections, 1962, 
I.C.J. Rep. 319 ¶ 347 (Dec. 21) at 347; South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.), Second Phase, 
1966 I.C.J. Rep. 6, 18 (July 18).
241. South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.), Second Phase, 1966 I.C.J. Rep. 6, 19 (July 18).
242. Id. at 28–29.  
243. Mbengue & Messihi, supra note 234.
244. William M. Reisman, Revision of the South West Africa Cases, 7 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 
64–65 (1966). 
245. Id. at 66–68.
246. Id. at 68–71.  
247. Id. at 71.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 83.
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article 60.”
250
Judge Jessup, in dissent, forcefully argued there was no dis-
tinction between a judgment in respect of jurisdiction and a judgment on the 
merits in terms of its binding effect.
251
In later years, the court has made 
clear that it considers decisions on jurisdiction as res judicata.252 However, 
it is one thing to conclude that decisions on preliminary objections are res 
judicata. It is a step further to reason that decisions on preliminary objec-
tions should be subject to revision. This is returned to in Part IV, below.
3. Ongoing Supervision of Judgments and Related Procedures
There have been other attempts to relitigate issues without resort to the 
revision procedure. In the Haya de la Torre case,253 Cuba’s application for 
intervention was denied on the basis that it was an attempt to reopen the 
court’s decision in the earlier Asylum case.254 In Nicaragua v. Colombia,255
one of Colombia’s preliminary objections contended that Nicaragua was 
seeking to appeal the 2012 Territorial and Maritime Dispute judgment.256
This objection was dismissed without discussion.
257
There are also cases in which the court continues to exercise a certain 
supervisory role in the implementation of its judgments. One example is the 
Gab kovo-Nagymaros Project, in which the special agreement between 
Hungary and Slovakia provides that following Judgment, the parties will 
enter into negotiations for its execution, and should there be no agreement 
within six months, either party may “request the Court to render an addi-
tional Judgment to determine the modalities of executing its Judgment.”
258
Slovakia submitted such an application for additional judgment in 1998, but 
250. South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.), Second Phase, 1966 I.C.J. Rep. 6, ¶ 59 (July 
18). 
251. South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.), Second Phase, 1966 I.C.J. Rep. 6, 325, 336–37
(July 18) (Jessup, J., dissenting).
252. Request for Interpretation of Judgment of 11 June 1998 Land and Maritime Bound-
ary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary Objection, 1999 
I.C.J. 31, 35 (Mar. 25). 
253. Haya de la Torre (Colom. v. Peru), Judgment, 1951 I.C.J. 71, 77 (June 13).
254. Christine M. Chinkin, Third-Party Intervention Before the International Court of 
Justice, 80 AM. J. INT’L L. 495, 509 (1986).
255. Question of Delimitation of Continental Shelf Between Nicaragua and Colombia 
Beyond 200 Nautical Miles from Nicaraguan Coast (Nicar. v. Colom.), Preliminary Objec-
tion, 2016 I.C.J. 100, 110 (Aug. 14); see also Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Plurality in 
the Fabric of International Courts and Tribunals: The Threads of a Managerial Approach, 28 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 13, 65 (2017). 
256. Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicar. v. Colom.), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 624 
(Nov. 19).
257. Question of Delimitation of Continental Shelf Between Nicaragua and Colombia 
Beyond 200 Nautical Miles from Nicaraguan Coast (Nicar. v. Colom.), Preliminary Objec-
tion, 2016 I.C.J. 100, 133 (Aug. 14).
258. Gab íkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), Special Agreement, 1993 I.C.J. 
1971, art. 5(3) (July 2). 
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negotiations recommenced and the application was eventually discontinued 
in 2017.
259
The case remains pending at the court, on the basis that the juris-
diction provided for by the special agreement continues and article 5(3) 
means that another application for additional judgment could be filed at any 
time.
260
The court has also made orders for the ongoing supervision of the im-
plementation of Provisional Measures orders.
261
This is entirely acceptable 
as provisional measures are incidental of the main event; their purpose is to 
preserve the status quo pending judgment, and the court’s power to continue 
supervision thereof will cease once the Judgment is entered. These exam-
ples are not analogous to revision.
IV. Proposals for Improving the Revision Procedure
The cases examined above reveal a series of potential problems arising 
from the court’s current approach to revision cases: the intervener problem, 
as seen in El Salvador v. Honduras; the jurisdiction and related Agent prob-
lem, as arising in the second revision application in Genocide; and the inter-
locutory problem demonstrated by the first Genocide revision application. 
One may break these challenges into two essential questions of procedure: 
First, whether the court should continue its practice of entering revision pro-
ceedings as new cases; and second, whether the court should permit revision 
of preliminary objections judgments.
A. A New Case and a New Jurisdiction?
The court has a clear and consistent practice of entering applications for 
revision as new contentious cases in the General List, but it is not at all ob-
vious that this practice is necessary or required.
262
Juan Quintana explains 
the process:
The formal opening of new proceedings is an operation that occurs 
when the case is entered in the General List and is assigned an offi-
cial name and folio number. This is an internal measure that is tak-
en by the Registrar of the Court, in consultation with the President, 
and it is normally performed shortly after a document instituting 
259. Gab íkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slok.), 2017-2018 Y.B. (I.C.J.) 8.
260. Id.
261. See Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Geno-
cide (Gam. v. Myan.), Provisional Measure, 2020 I.C.J. 1, 23–24 (Jan. 23); Certain Activities 
Carried Out by Nicaragua in Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicar.), Provisional Measure, 2011 
I.C.J. 6, 28 (Mar. 11); Request for Interpretation of Judgment of 15 June 1962 in Temple of 
Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thai.), Provisional Measure, 2011 I.C.J. 537 (Apr. 28); Applica-
tion of International Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Geor. 
v Russ.), Provisional Measure, 2008 I.C.J. 353, ¶ 149 (Oct. 15).
262. ROSENNE, supra note 21, at 53. 
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proceedings is filed. The entering of a new case in the General List 
is not disclosed to the public at large as such, and this is why the 
name that the case is to bear and the number under which it makes 
an entry in the List are only known when the Court issues the first 
procedural order in the case, which is normally the order fixing 
time-limits for the initial round of written pleadings. The actual en-
tering of the case in the List, however, always precedes the adop-
tion of that order.
263
Rather than opening a new case, a revision proceeding should be con-
sidered as a derivative or incidental proceeding. A derivative or incidental 
proceeding is an application which seeks any order other than a final judg-
ment; examples include a decision on provisional measures under article 
41,
264
or an order in respect of compensation rendered after the decision on 
the merits.
265
Manley Hudson introduced the expression “incidental jurisdic-
tion” in 1934,
266
using it to describe proceedings for revision and interpreta-
tion. Rosenne argues that incidental proceedings take place pendente lite 
while the mainline proceedings are in progress, while derivative proceed-
ings take place after the principal judgment on the merits of the case.
267
There is nothing in the Statute or the Rules which requires the court to open 
a separate case in derivative proceedings. Properly conceived, revision pro-
ceedings are necessarily derivative, and should not be treated as a new case.
Andreas Zimmermann and Geiß put forward a series of justifications 
for treating revision applications as new cases.
268
The first reason has to do 
with the structure of the court’s Rules — a “systematic” reason. They ob-
serve that incidental proceedings are dealt with in Part III, Section D, while 
revision proceedings are regulated in Section F, subsection 2.
269
This rather 
tenuous argument is further supported by their contention that it is “con-
sistent with the practice that judges ad hoc of the original proceedings are 
263. Juan J. Quintana, Procedure Before the ICJ: A Note on the Opening (Or Not) of 
New Cases, 9 L. & PRAC. INT’L CTS. & TRIBS. 115, 117 (2010); see also ROSENNE, supra 
note 28, at 197–208 (for more information on the General List). 
264. See Cameron Miles, The Origins of the Law of Provisional Measures before Inter-
national Courts and Tribunals, 73 HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 615, 671 (2013).
265. See Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Order, 1949 I.C.J. 237 (Nov. 19).
266. MANLEY O. HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE: A
TREATISE 360 (1934).
267. ROSENNE, supra note 21, at 190.,
268. See Geiß & Zimmermann, supra note 21, at 1666; Akande, supra note 195. The 
arguments of all three authors are approved by Jessica Joly Hébert. She likewise recommends 
that revision be treated as a new case; although suggests that because the links between a revi-
sion and its original judgment are “sturdier” than in a situation of interpretation, revision pro-
ceedings should be given a new designation as “additional proceedings”. Hébert, supra note 
144, at 222–27. 
269. Geiß & Zimmermann supra note 21, at 1666.
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[T]he very nature of revision proceedings supports their qualifica-
tion as a new case, given that . . . the [s]tate intends to initiate the 
reconsideration of a settled case, already removed from the Court’s 
list of pending cases.
271
Zimmermann and Geiß, along with Dapo Akande, also point to the 
court’s treatment of the Agent for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr. Sakib Soft-
i , in the second Genocide revision application, described in Part III.A.3 
above. Because the court treated the revision application as a new case, it 
could not be submitted by Mr. Softi without a clear, new, appointment as 
Agent.
272
However, the court’s treatment of Mr. Softi is a consequence of 
the court’s treating revision applications as new cases; it is not a cause. It 
does not explain the court’s approach.
Nor do the other arguments support a claim that revision must be treat-
ed as a new case. To take the argument related to judges ad hoc, it is true 
that rarely have the same judges opined on both the original case and the re-
vision application. In El Salvador v. Honduras, because the original judg-
ment had been delivered by an ad hoc Chamber, article 100(1) of the Rules 
of Court required that request for its revision should be dealt with “by that 
Chamber.” Yet, in El Salvador v. Honduras, the ad hoc Chamber no longer 
existed and “most of its members had passed away,”
273
requiring the consti-
tution of a new Chamber. And in Genocide, neither of the judges ad hoc
were reappointed. But, as with the issue of the Agent, this confuses cause 
and consequence. In New Zealand v. France, even though the Request was 
treated as “part of the same case and not of a new one,”
274
a different judge 
ad hoc (Sir Geoffrey Palmer, replacing Sir Garfield Barwick) was appoint-
ed.
275
The court’s practice in this respect did not demand that revision be 
treated procedurally as a new case. At best, it was inconclusive.
What then of the argument that revision requires the reopening of a set-
tled case, which will have been removed from the List?
276
Again, New Zea-
land v. France is instructive. As noted by Judge ad hoc Palmer, in that case, 
“the formal fact of the status of the case on the Court’s formal list is irrele-
270. Id.
271. Id.; see also Akande, supra note 195.
272. Geiß & Zimmermann supra note 21, at 1666; Akande, supra note 195.
273. ROSENNE, supra note 21, at 141. 
274. Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of 
the Court’s Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Order, 1995 
I.C.J. 288 ¶ 49 (Sept. 22). 
275. Id.
276. Geiß & Zimmermann supra note 21, at 1666; see also Akande, supra note 195.
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vant”.
277
The Nuclear Tests case was treated as concluded and removed from 
the List, and the Request was entered separately on the List, but this did not 
prevent the court from treating the Request proceedings as derivative and as 
a continuation of the original case.
278
Treating applications for revision as new cases also immediately raises 
the question of where the court founds the jurisdiction of the new case. The 
court did not appear to consider a new consent to jurisdiction necessary. As 
observed by Quintana:
[S]ince 1978 the governing criterion for the Registrar as to the 
manner in which he treats unilateral acts seeking to institute conten-
tious proceedings should be whether the Application proposes to 
found the jurisdiction of the Court upon a consent already given or 
manifested by the State named as Respondent in that document.
279
The Registrar has never rejected a revision application for want of ju-
risdiction, nor have parties recited any pleas with respect to jurisdiction in 
their applications for revision. On this basis, the revision jurisdiction is ei-
ther founded on a continuation of the original case jurisdiction, or some-
where else. Consensus appears to favor the latter. Akande points out that de-
spite the revision application being entered as a new case, the jurisdictional 
basis is not the same as that for the original case, nor does the court require 
the parties’ consent. Rather, it is the parties’ “consent to the Statute itself” 
that gives the court jurisdiction.
280
Quintana agrees, observing that the juris-
diction of the court to revise its own judgments is “statutory.”
281
He says that 
the revision jurisdiction is “bestowed upon the Court by all of the [s]tates 
that become parties to the Statute.”
282
Rosenne also says that the court’s 
treatment of its interpretation jurisdiction, as “a special jurisdiction deriving 
directly from Article 60 of the Statute,”
283
is analogous and “equally appli-
cable to requests for revision.”
284
Chester Brown goes so far as to claim that 
the jurisdiction of a court to revise its judgments is inherent.
285
277. Request for an Examination of Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the 
Court’s Judgment of 20 December 1974 in Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Order, 1995 I.C.J. 288 
¶ 52 (Sept. 22). (Palmer, J., dissenting).
278. See Request for an Examination of Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of 
the Court’s Judgment of 20 December 1974 in Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Order, 1995 I.C.J. 
288, ¶¶ 49–54 (Sept. 22). 
279. Quintana, supra note 263, at 123. 
280. Akande, supra note 268. 
281. QUINTANA, supra note 21, at 1029.
282. Id.
283. Application for Revision and Interpretation of Judgment of 24 February 1982 in 
Continental Shelf (Tunis./Libya) Judgment, 1985 I.C.J. 192 ¶ 43 (Dec. 10).
284. ROSENNE, supra note 21, at 36 n.26; see also Kazimierz Grzybowski, Interpreta-
tion of Decisions of International Tribunals, 35 AM. J. INT’L L. 482, 495 (1941) (stating that 
the Permanent Court of International Justice [PCIJ] “possesses this jurisdiction as an excep-
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These arguments related to jurisdiction are convincing, even though 
they do not directly resolve the Agent problem. However, for present pur-
poses the question is whether revision demands to be treated as a new case. 
To the extent that the parties are not required to manifest a new consent to 
the court’s jurisdiction, this is evidence that it is not a new case. Indeed, the 
key feature of incidental and derivative jurisdiction is that it does not de-
pend upon the consent of the parties but flows directly from the Statute.
286
As to the Agent problem, the invalidity of the appointment of the Agent 
in Genocide needs not be justified on the basis that the revision was a new 
case – problems relating to the validity of the appointment of an Agent can 
arise in any phase.
287
Moreover, the appointment, or not, of an Agent does 
not preclude a challenge to the court’s jurisdiction; the two issues are quite 
separate.
288
An additional point to note is that if revision were in fact a new case, 
one could argue that the admissibility of the application should turn not only 
on the existence of a new fact under article 61, but should also require the 
existence of a dispute under article 38, and the respondent party’s awareness 
tion from the general principles of international law, and it is based upon the express wording 
of Article 60 of the Statute.”).
285. Chester Brown, The Cross-Fertilization of Principles Relating to Procedure and 
Remedies in the Jurisprudence of International Courts and Tribunals, 30 LOY. L.A. INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 219, 224–25 (2008); see also Brown, supra note 152, at 218. See generally
Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by United Nations Administrative Tribunal, Adviso-
ry Opinion, 1954 I.C.J. 47, 55 (July 13) (suggesting that the PCIJ appeared to indicate that the 
power of revision is inherent.). Contra Bowett, supra note 3, at 590 (arguing that it is “doubt-
ful” there is an inherent power of revision.). 
286. HUDSON, supra note 130, at 360; see Cameron Miles, Provisional Measures and 
the ‘New’ Plausibility in the Jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, BRIT. Y.B.
INT’L L. (ADVANCE ARTICLE) 1 (2018) (showing an example where an order for provisional 
measures need only establish prima facie jurisdiction).
287. Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide 
(Bosn. v. Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43, ¶¶ 22–24 (July 
11). Indeed, the validity of an Agent’s appointment was raised during the merits phase of 
Genocide: A Co-Agent purportedly appointed by the Serbian member of the tripartite Presi-
dency of Bosnia and Herzegovina attempted to discontinue the case, while the Chairman for 
the Presidency and the agent originally appointed (Mr. Sakib Softi ) did not wish to do so. 
The Court eventually held that “Bosnia and Herzegovina had not demonstrated its will to 
withdraw the Application in an unequivocal manner” and thus “there had been no discontinu-
ance of the case.” Id.; see also Franklin Berman & Gleider Hernández, Article 42, in THE 
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY supra note 21, 967,
969–72.
288. See Statute ICJ, supra note 2, art. 42 (the article requires the appointment of an 
Agent but makes no provision as to who appoints the Agent). The other articles also do not 
make a provision for appointment the Agent. See Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
In the Nuclear Tests Case, however, France did not appoint an Agent at all. Request for an 
Examination of Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court’s Judgment of 20 De-
cember 1974 in Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Order, 1995 I.C.J. 288, ¶ 29 (Sept. 22); see also
Maritime Delimitation Between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal (Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.), Order, 
1995 I.C.J. Rep. 423, 424 (Nov. 8); Berman & Hernández, supra note 287, 969–72. 
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of that dispute.
289
Thus, it does not further support the view that revision 
should not be considered a new case.
Dietmar Prager also points out that it is unconvincing to argue that a 
new case is required because the Statute requires the filing of an Applica-
tion. Interventions under article 62 are not dealt with as new cases, even 
though a request to intervene also requires an Application.
290
Revision is, rather, a remedy that returns to the point of origin. It reo-
pens the original case, for reasons of individual justice and systemic authori-
ty, to ensure that the facts on which the judgment were based are accurate. 
A revision is an amendment, “without reargument.”
291
The International 
Law Commission in 1958 defined the revision procedure as one for “reo-
pening a case upon the ground of the discovery of new facts,”
292
and as not-
ed by Judge Koroma, the court’s task is to “reconsider a matter”
293
in light 
of the fresh evidence. Judge ad hoc Bastid called it a “modification.”294
This leads to the question of what it implies to reopen the merits of a 
case.
295
Kaikobad argues that “a flawed decision based on incomplete 
knowledge with potentially adverse effects cannot create valid legal 
rights.
296
As such, once new, decisive facts are found to exist, the original 
judgment may no longer have the force of res judicata.297 To this end, some 
take the view that the court is not bound by any of its reasoning in the prin-
cipal judgment.
298
Dissenting Judge ad hoc Paolillo in El Salvador v. Hon-
duras perceives the second stage of the procedure as being a “fresh exami-
289. Juliette McIntyre, Put on Notice: The Role of the Dispute Requirement in Assessing 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility Before the International Court, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 546, 548 
(2018). Contra Statute ICJ, supra note 2, art. 60 (requiring the existence of a dispute regard-
ing “the meaning or scope of the judgment.”).
290. Dietmar W. Prager, Procedural Developments at the International Court of Justice,
1 L. & P. INT’L CTS. & TRIBS. 189, 214 (2002).
291. DURWARD V. SANDIFER, EVIDENCE BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 284 
(1939), cited in REISMAN, NULLITY AND REVISION, supra note 21, at 212 n.139, 425.
292. Commentary on the Draft Convention on Arbitral Procedure Adopted by the Inter-
national Law Commission at its Fifth Session, prepared by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/92, 101 (1955).
293. Application for Revision of Judgment of 11 July 1996 in Application of Conven-
tion on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. v. Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 7, 24 ¶ 2 (Feb. 3) (separate opinion by Koroma, J.).
294. Application for Revision and Interpretation of the Judgment of 24 February 1982 in 
Continental Shelf (Tunis./Libya), Judgment, 1985 I.C.J. 192, ¶¶ 3, 248 (Dec. 10) (separate 
opinion by Bastid, J.).
295. See id.
296. KAIKOBAD, supra note 18, at 305.
297. CHENG, supra note 46, at 370.
298. Geiß, supra note 8, at 184–85; see also Application for Revision and Interpretation 
of Judgment of 24 February 1982 in Continental Shelf (Tunis./Libya), Judgment, 1985 I.C.J. 
192, 247 (Dec. 10) (separate opinion by Bastid, J.) (while observing that the Statute is “silent”
as to the effects of an admissible revision application, queries, “[w]hat would it imply to reo-
pen the merits of a case, and to what extent should the case as a whole be reviewed?”).
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nation of the merits of the dispute . . . A new decision on the merits.”
299
Dis-
senting Judge ad hoc Dimitrijevi  in Genocide posited that opening the pro-
ceedings for revision would not have precluded “any possible finding by the 
Court that the facts existing at the time of the 1996 Judgment were such that 
the Court could nevertheless entertain jurisdiction,”
300
including those the 
court had previously dismissed.
301
In other words, the revision would set 
aside the entirety of the original judgment, not merely the part impeached 
by the new fact.
302
By contrast, Joly Hébert suggests that “both judgments 
remain, at least partly, applicable.”
303
Judge Vereshchetin considered that 
the admissibility of an application for revision did not prejudge “the ulti-
mate result of the revision.”
304
While of decisive importance, the new fact 
may not ultimately change the outcome.
305
Bowett, however, suggests that 
“because revision is dependent on the discovery of new facts, the procedure 
does not allow a re-hearing of legal arguments already heard and decided 
upon.”
306
The court has not to date answered this question, but regardless of the 
extent to which the original judgment is altered, the fact remains that a suc-
cessful revision will result in “the judgment which ought to have been given 
in the first place.”
307
As observed by the drafters in The Hague, the judges 
undertaking revision “complete, so to speak, their former information.”
308
This strongly indicates that revision is not a new case but, rather, a deriva-
tive proceeding. This is not a point of mere semantics, rather a demand for a
clear procedural and conceptual relationship between the revision proceed-
ings and the impeached judgment.
299. Application for Revision of Judgment of 11 September 1992 in Land, Island and 
Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal./Hond), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 392, 413, 425–26, ¶ 42
(Sept. 11) (Paolillio, J., dissenting).
300. Application for Revision of Judgment of 11 July 1996 in Application of Conven-
tion on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. v. Yugoslavia), Judgment, 
2003 I.C.J. Rep. 7, ¶¶ 53, 68 (Feb. 3) (Dimitrijevi , J., dissenting).
301. Id. at 69 ¶ 57.
302. Contra CHENG, supra note 46, at 370 n.23 (writing that “[i]t need hardly be re-
called that nullity and a fortiori error may affect only part of a judgment.”).
303. Hébert, supra note 144, at 226.
304. Application for Revision of Judgment of 11 July 1996 in Application of Conven-
tion on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. v. Yugoslavia), Judgment, 
2003 I.C.J. Rep. 7, 39, 50 ¶ 28 (Feb. 3) (Vereshchetin., dissenting).
305. KAIKOBAD, supra note 18, at 321. Kaikobad explains the complexity of this issue 
with respect to boundary lines and suggests that the law of delimitation requires that even 
where a new fact of decisive importance is found to exist, the Court must still assess whether 
or not to redraw the boundary line, and once it has done so factors additional to the new fact, 
such as equitable considerations, will come into play.
306. Bowett, supra note 43, at 591.
307. KAIKOBAD, supra note 18, at 306.
308. SCOTT, supra note 82, at 749.
520 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 42:479
There is one final point to be made supporting this position, and, while 
it is made in passing, it is of vital importance. It relates to the intervener 
problem. According to article 63(2) of the court’s Statute, a State interven-
ing in proceedings concerned with the interpretation of a multilateral treaty 
is bound, just as the original parties are, by the court’s interpretation. But 
the court’s present approach of treating revision as a new case means that if 
the intervening State does not apply to appear in the revision proceedings, it 
will be bound by a decision that is no longer correct. This absurdity (along 
with the inefficiencies of re-intervening under article 62 identified in section 
III.A.2, above) could be easily avoided if the court treated revision as deriv-
ative, rather than as a new case.
B. Revision of Preliminary Objections – A Return to Finality
The procedural flaws in the court’s habit of treating revision proceed-
ings as new cases become even more apparent when one considers that the 
court has also permitted revision of judgments on preliminary objections. A 
separate case does not make sense if the principal proceedings are still pend-
ing.
309
One may make a strong argument for why the court should amend its 
Rules to prevent applications for revision in respect of preliminary objec-
tions.
310
To begin with, it is entirely probable that a decision on the merits will 
be rendered prior to the expiry of the ten-year time limit mandated by article 
61.
311
Were the court to revise a decision on preliminary objections, the 
flow-on effect for the merits judgment would not be clear at all. In Geno-
cide, the court did not suspend proceedings on the merits,312 suggesting the 
possibility of rendering a decision on the merits that turns out to have been 
issued ultra vires. By treating the revision as a new case, rather than as a de-
rivative proceeding, the procedural relationship becomes even further re-
moved.
It may be that one could simply say the merits decision is automatically 
voided. But this is not necessarily the case; for example, if a jurisdictional 
claim based on the treaty is revised, what happens to claims based upon cus-
309. Prager, supra note 290, at 214.
310. Contra Kunz, supra note 52, at 8. In the context of arbitration, Kunz asserts but 
does not justify that revision is available as a remedy for preliminary decisions. Kunz goes on 
to suggest that revision cannot be sought against procedural orders or orders for interim relief 
which a tribunal can reverse or modify. This approach would unnecessarily reopen the can of 
worms in the South West Africa Case. See South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.), Preliminary 
Objection, 1962 I.C.J. 319 (Dec. 21).
311. The International Law Association reports that as of 2018, the average length of 
proceedings, from application to judgment, was 103-104 months (excluding extensions, join-
der of proceedings, and provisional measures. ARMAN SARVARIAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
ASSOCIATION, PROCEDURES OF INTERNAITONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, INTERIM REPORT
(2018). 
312. See supra Part III.A.3.
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tomary law or another treaty?
313
This relates directly to the issue discussed 
above–how much of the impugned original judgment is to stand? It is entire-
ly possible that the merits judgment, or parts thereof, could remain in force 
by taking an alternative jurisdictional route. Nothing in the Statute, Rules, or 
the court’s current practice offers an answer to this problem.
More fundamentally, revision of preliminary objections judgments 
should not be permitted because it will conflate revision on the basis of fait 
nouveau with annulment for excès de pouvoir. As detailed in Part II, above, 
when the contours of the revision procedure were agreed at The Hague, a 
clear distinction was drawn between revision and the possibility of annul-
ment. Whether or not an arbitral award could be annulled was left unre-
solved.
314
Some judges on the Advisory Committee of Jurists in 1920 de-
clared that it was “inadmissible” that the Permanent Court of International 
Justice should be able to annul its own decisions.
315
In subsequent years, this 
has been overlooked.
The precise contours of excès de pouvoir are open to debate, but, with-
out question, it encompasses decisions made in excess of the jurisdictional 
competence of the tribunal.
316
It embodies the maxim extra compromissum 
arbiter nihil facere potest–a maxim deriving from Roman civil law meaning 
that because the arbitrator’s jurisdiction is voluntary, they cannot act outside 
the authorization granted by the parties.
317
The court has grappled with this 
concept in its case law. In Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal, the parties had been 
unable to reach a settlement in respect of maritime delimitation. They had 
submitted their dispute to an arbitral tribunal, the decision of which was 
rendered in 1989. Guinea-Bissau subsequently brought an action to the 
court, alleging the award rendered by the tribunal was null and void on the 
grounds of excès de pouvoir and insufficiency of reasoning.318 In concluding 
that the award was not void, the court defined excès de pouvoir as an act “in 
313. See Questions Relating to Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.), 
Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 422, 448 ¶ 63 (July 20). The Court did “not find it necessary” to consid-
er its jurisdiction under Statute, art. 36(2), because it had founded jurisdiction on the United 
Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment. See United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, arts. 6(2), 7(1), Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
314. SCOTT, supra note 82, at 151.
315. League of Nations, Documents Concerning the Action Taken by the Council of the 
League of Nations Under Article 14 of the Covenant and the Adoption by the Assembly of the 
Statute of the Permanent Court, at 103, League of Nations (1921).
316. R. Erich, Projet de Conférer à la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale des 
Fonctions d’une Instance de Recours, 3(ser. 12) REVUE DE DROIT INT’L ET DE LEGISLATION 
COMPAREE 268 (1931).
317. AARON X. FELLMETH & MAURICE HORWITZ, GUIDE TO LATIN IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 35 (2009).
318. See Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.), Judgment, 1991 I.C.J. 
Rep. 53, 59 (Nov. 12).
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manifest breach of the competence conferred” on the tribunal.
319
Judge Ni 
described it as a situation in which a tribunal “has exceeded or overstepped 
the powers which have been attributed to it by the Parties.”
320
As such, where any tribunal allegedly lacks jurisdiction, the appropriate 
claim is one of nullity for excès de pouvoir, not an application for revision 
of the decision. Annulment is concerned with the legitimacy of the pro-
cess,
321
not the substantive correctness of the decision,
322
which is the realm 
of revision. Moreover, and in any event, allegations of excès de pouvoir
cannot be raised until after the conclusion of the hearing on the merits.
323
In-
deed, this must necessarily be the case, because until the merits have been 
decided, it cannot be known with certainty whether the decision-makers 
have overstepped the bounds of their authority. It must be recalled that 
when the revision procedure was drafted, there was no procedure for sepa-
rating preliminary objections from the merits–this was not included until the 
1926 iteration of the PCIJ Rules.
324
In 1875, the Institut de droit interna-
tional declared there was to be no appeal from any preliminary judgments 
on the question of a tribunal’s competency.
325
The intersection of revision 
and preliminary objections was not given any consideration.
Decisions on preliminary objections were not considered res judicata
until relatively recently. As noted in Part III.B.2, above, the court held in 
South-West Africa that it was unnecessary to decide on “whether a decision 
on a preliminary objection constitutes a res judicata in the proper sense of 
that term, whether it ranks as a ‘decision’ for the purposes of article 59 of 
the court’s Statute, or as ‘final’ within the meaning of article 60.”
326
It was not until the 1978 iteration of the Rules that decisions on prelim-
inary objections were required to be rendered in the form of a judgment. 
319. Id. at 69.
320. Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.), Judgment, 1991 I.C.J. 
Rep. 53, 96, 101 (Ni, J. dissenting). 
321. See David D. Caron, Reputation and Reality in the ICSID Annulment Process: Un-
derstanding the Distinction Between Annulment and Appeal, 7 ICSID FOREIGN INV. L.J. 21, 
26 (1992).
322. See, e.g., Christoph Schreuer, From ICSID Annulment to Appeal: Half Way Down 
the Slippery Slope, 10 L. & PRAC. INT’L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 211, 212 (2011).
323. See, e.g., Verdoss, supra note 116, at 242 (quoted as saying, “Ce n’est que lorsque 
la sentence finale est rendue que la cause de nullité pour excès de pouvoir peut être invoquée 
éventuellement,” which translates to, “It is only when the final award is made that the cause of 
nullity for excess of power can possibly be invoked.”).
324. See discussion supra Part II.D.
325. See Projet de règlement pour la procedure arbitrale internationale, 1877 
ANNUAIRE INSTITUT DE DROIT INT’L 130 (“Aucune voie de recours ne sera ouverte contre 
des jugements préliminaires sur la compétence, si ce n’est cumulativement avec le recours 
contre le jugement arbitral définitif.” [“No appeal will be opened against preliminary judg-
ments on jurisdiction, except cumulatively with appeal against the final arbitral judgment.”]).
326. South West Africa Cases (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), Second Phase, 1966 
I.C.J. Rep. 6, ¶ 37 (July 18).
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Subsequently, the court has emphasized that there is no “distinction between 
judgments on jurisdiction and judgments on the merits when it comes to the 
application of the res judicata principle.”327 In the interpretation proceedings 
in Cameroon-Nigeria,328 the court stated:
By virtue of the second sentence of article 60, the Court has juris-
diction to entertain requests for interpretation of any judgment ren-
dered by it. This provision makes no distinction as to the type of 
judgment concerned. It follows, therefore, that a judgment on pre-
liminary objections, just as well as a judgment on the merits, can be 
the object of a request for interpretation.
329
Rosenne suggests that this judgment settles the “doctrinal controversy 
whether a judgment on preliminary objections constitutes res judicata,”330
which in turn opens decisions on jurisdiction to being “subjected to the pro-
cedures of interpretation and presumably revision.”
331
That decisions on pre-
liminary objections could be the subject of revision is also alluded to in the 
dissenting opinion of Judge Jessup in South-West Africa,332 and, of course, 
the court in Genocide did not question Bosnia and Herzegovina’s applica-
tion on such a basis.
333
However, it is one thing to conclude that decisions on 
preliminary objections are res judicata. It is a step further to argue that deci-
sions on preliminary objections should be subject to revision. To permit this 
327. Mbengue & Messihi, supra note 234, at 28; see also Application of the Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb.), Judg-
ment, 2007 I.C.J. Rep. 43, 90 (Feb. 26). 
328. Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 11 June 1998 in Land and Maritime 
Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Judgment, 1999. I.C.J. Rep. 
31, 35 (March 25).  
329. Id.  
330. ROSENNE, supra note 21, at 111.
331. Id. at 109. Cf. Benjamin Salas Kantor & María Elisa Zavala Achurra, The Principle 
of Res Judicata Before the International Court of Justice: In the Midst of Comradeship and 
Divorce Between International Tribunals, 10 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 288, 294 (2019) 
(“the extent to which a decision on jurisdiction is binding for the Court in the merits phase is 
still controversial”).
332. See South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.), Second Phase, 1966 I.C.J. Rep. 6, 325, 332
(July 18) (Jessup, J., dissenting); see also South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.), Second Phase, 
1966 I.C.J. Rep. 6, 239, 240 (Koretsky, J. dissenting).
333. However, by hearing arguments as to jurisdiction raised by the Initiative during the 
oral phase of the merits, proceedings in Bosn/Herz. v. Serb., 2007 I.C.J. Rep. at 90, the Court 
muddied the waters somewhat. The distinguishing factor, one could argue, is that while a de-
cision on preliminary objections is res judicata, to the extent that it does not address every 
preliminary issue, other arguments could be raised at a later date. This was the interpretation 
of Article 79bis(1) of the Rules of Court (“other objection the decision upon which is request-
ed before any further proceedings on the merits”) contented for by FRY/Serbia’s counsel. Ap-
plication of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosn. & Herz. V. Serb.), Verbatim Record, ¶ 4.29 (Mar. 9, 2006, 10:00 AM), 
https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/91/091-20060309-ORA-01-00-BI.pdf..
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is to blur the line between revision and nullity and to take the procedure fur-
ther than it was ever intended to go.
So, if decisions on preliminary jurisdiction should not be subject to re-
vision, can one ensure justice is done between the parties? Theinel and 
Zimmermann take an uncompromising approach, suggesting “a judgment 
upholding jurisdiction with the force of res judicata in fact establishes such 
jurisdiction as a matter of law.”
334
On this basis, the Court effectively cannot 
act excès de pouvoir. The possibility of revising the decision on the merits, 
of course, remains.
Alternatively, Verdoss considers that if an excès de pouvoir is estab-
lished, part of the judgment or award rendered without authority is void, ip-
so jure.335 But this arguably runs the risk of a party unilaterally declaring the 
judgment void in order to avoid compliance, which has potentially disas-
trous consequences for the court’s perceived legitimacy,
336
along with the 
stability of legal relations.
337
Cheng suggests an invalid decision could be reconsidered by another 
tribunal if both parties agree to submit the question to arbitration.
338
Howev-
er, this raises the question of the authority of that tribunal to judge the acts 
of the court, and certainly calls into question the perception of the court as 
sitting at the apex of the system’s fragmented international courts and tribu-
nals.
339
Instead, as Thomas Franck has observed, the court’s capacity to “pull” 
states towards compliance with its decisions rests on the legitimacy and 
fairness of its opinion-forming process.
340
This returns to the heart of the 
matter and brings to light the relationship between procedural justice and 
“essential justice—a correct decision on the merits of the case.”
341
Put simp-
ly, revision has an important but not omnipresent role to play. On balance, 
finality should trump justice in respect of decisions on jurisdiction.
334. Theinel & Zimmermann, supra note 67, at 1633. 
335. See Verdoss, supra note 116, at 241.
336. See Franck, supra note 19, at 40.
337. See REISMAN, supra note 21, at 45.
338. See, e.g., CHENG, supra note 46, at 371.
339. See Jonathon I. Charney, Third Party Dispute Settlement and International Law, 36 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 65, 71 (1998); Andrew Lang, The Role of the International Court 
of Justice in a Context of Fragmentation, 62 INT’L & COMPAR. L.Q. 777, 779 (2013); Neil B. 
Nucup, Infallible or Final?: Revisiting the Legitimacy of the International Court of Justice as 
the “Invisible” International Supreme Court, 8 L. & PRAC. INT’L CTS. & TRIBS. 145, 146 
(2019).
340. See Franck, supra note 19, at 31.
341. H.W.A. Thirlway, Procedural Law and the International Court of Justice, in FIFTY 
YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE – ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SIR ROBERT 
JENNINGS 389, 400 (Vaughan Lowe & Malgosia Fitzmaurice eds., 1996).
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As such, the court’s compétence de la compétence should not be open 
to revision.
342
In an extreme case, such as fraud, the proper remedy is not 
revision, but annulment.
343
This leads to one difficulty faced by the dele-
gates at The Hague in 1899: Who judges the judges? Their inability to an-
swer this question led to the matter of annulment being left out of the draft-
ing task altogether. This problem is no greater than that faced by courts of 
last resort in domestic systems.
344
A court has inherent power to set aside a 
judgment which it has delivered without jurisdiction. As noted by the Eng-
lish Court of Appeal, so far as procedure is concerned “the court in its in-
herent jurisdiction can set aside its own order, and. . . it is not necessary to 
appeal from it.”
345
It is a matter ex debito justiciae, and there should be no 
requirement to meet the stringent conditions of article 61. Rather, the court 
should adopt a procedure, sui generis, should the need ever arise.346
V. Conclusion
This account of the revision procedure suggests that it continues to be in 
need of some refinement. The procedure has been neglected, if not at times 
entirely disregarded. The procedural problems that arise in the court’s prac-
tice are avoidable errors, requiring two minor changes: first, the court 
should no longer treat revision applications as new cases. There is nothing 
in the Statute or the Rules which requires this approach, and, as seen above, 
it leads to several unnecessary complications. Second, the court should no 
longer accept applications for revision of preliminary objections and should 
make this clear in its Rules. The only solution for a claim of incorrectly 
seized jurisdiction is to annul the decision. Revision is not the appropriate 
remedy. These proposals do not advocate for increased formalism but, ra-
ther, for increased clarity and a greater thoughtfulness. The domestic ante-
cedents and drafting history of revision emphasize the role of revision as a 
means of doing substantial justice between the parties,
347
and it remains an 
342. See CHITTHARANJAN F. AMERASINGHE, JURISDICTION OF SPECIFIC 
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 185 (2009). 
343. See, e.g., id. at 189; see also CHENG, supra note 46, at 358.
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important remedy for the court. With some adjustment, revision can contin-
ue to serve its essential, if limited, function.
